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For several decades, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs1), Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, were the largest players in an American housing finance system that provided effective 
mortgage financing for many millions of Americans. Since early 2008, the firms’ near-
insolvency has called their future into question. This paper lays out criteria for evaluating 
proposals for reform of the two firms. We make no recommendations among the proposals, but 
we do attempt to assess the major advantages and disadvantages of their respective approaches.  
 
In Part I, we provide an overview of the U.S. housing finance system, review the basic 
operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac before conservatorship, and summarize the key 
arguments made about the strengths and weaknesses of their structures. We pay particular 
attention to the role that GSEs have played in the multifamily housing finance market. (While we 
review some basic features of the housing finance system, we assume familiarity with the 
historical development and current operation of the primary channels of U.S. housing finance 
and the details of the GSEs’ current conservatorship. For readers who wish to explore these 
issues further, an extensive literature already exists.2)  
 
In Part II, we introduce the basic goals of a healthy secondary market for both the single- and 
multifamily market, and we offer a framework to help to describe and understand the different 
proposals for reform and how variants of Fannie and Freddie might fit into that picture. In Part 
III, we look in detail at some of the specific proposals now emerging for reform of the housing 
finance system. 
I. FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC (COLLECTIVELY THE GSES) 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are only two of many entities that bring capital to the housing 
market to help borrowers finance the purchase of single- and multifamily homes. Until the 
1930s, most loans for the purchase of residential property came from banks that held the 
resulting mortgages in their portfolios and financed these holding through deposits. To 
supplement deposits as a source of funds to loan out, the Federal Home Loan banks provided 
                                                 
1 The Federal Home Loan Banks are also GSEs, but we use the term ‘GSEs’ to refer only to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.  
2 Thorough overviews of the federal government housing agencies and the role of the GSEs are provided by 
Bradford 1979 (on federal involvement in housing through this date), Frame and White 2004 (on the specific role of 
the GSEs in the mortgage market), Green and Schnare 2009, Jaffee and Quigley 2007 (on the role of federal 
guarantees in the housing market), Pennington-Cross 2002 (a comparison of FHA and subprime lending market 
shares), Quigley 2006 (on the federal role in the mortgage market and homeownership).  
Coverage of the history of the mortgage market as well as discussions about the cause for the current housing 
crisis can be found in Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 2006 (on subprime lending), Fishback et al. 2001 (on 
the origins of the modern mortgage market), Green and Wachter 2005 (for a history and comparison of U.S. to 
international mortgage markets), Listokin et al. 2001 (on mortgage innovations and homeownership), and Taylor 
2007 (on the influence of interest rates on housing cycles). For a review of the history and evolution of bank 
portfolio lending, see Ambrose et al. 2005 (for an analysis of the choice to retain a loan portfolio), Blasko and 
Sinkey 2006 (on the restructuring of bank portfolios and real estate lending during the 1990s), Furlong 1992 (for an 
overview of bank regulatory changes), and Hancock et al. 2006 (examining the impact of Basel II capital regulations 
on the mortgage market).  
Finally, for an outline of the role of the private sector in mortgage securitization, see Frankel 2006 (on housing 
market appreciation and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) valuations), Van Order 2007 (provides a review of 
securitization, including agency (GSE) and non-agency (non-GSE) MBS), and Lea 2006.  
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additional funding to their members through “advances,” which are loans secured by mortgages 
themselves.3  
 
During the Depression, Fannie was created to allow banks to originate a greater number of 
mortgages. Fannie Mae would purchase FHA-insured loans from banks so that the banks could 
fund additional mortgages.4 Until 1968, Fannie Mae was a government agency and so could 
borrow money in the private capital markets based on the financial strength of the federal 
government. Freddie Mac was established in 1970 as part of the Federal Home Loan bank 
system (a set of regional cooperatives owned by the banks) and so was able to raise capital based 
on the implicit backing of the federal government enjoyed by that system. Both used the money 
they raised to buy mortgages from banks and others who had originated them, thus allowing 
those originators to originate even more mortgages. As major buyers of mortgages, Fannie and 
Freddie helped to standardize the documents used to originate mortgages, and, perhaps more 
important, the products that were offered and the underwriting standards that the property and 
the borrower had to meet. 
 
In 1968, Fannie Mae was privatized (at least partly to remove its liabilities from the federal 
budget) but a portion of its activity was maintained as part of the government and folded into a 
new agency called the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), or Ginnie Mae 
(Jaffee and Quigley 2010). As a government entity, GNMA remained explicitly backed by the 
full faith and credit of the federal government, and thus its securities traded with pricing close to 
that of the federal debt.5 GNMA carried on the role of helping to ensure liquidity for mortgages 
made under such federal programs as the FHA (Federal Housing Administration) and the VA 
(Veterans Administration), which already provided loan-level guarantees on the loans originated 
under their programs. These programs set their own underwriting standards for the loans they 
backed and so did not require additional underwriting or oversight by GNMA. The new, private 
Fannie Mae, by contrast, provided liquidity for mortgages that did not have direct government 
backing.6  
 
Starting in the 1970s, Fannie and Freddie moved from a buy-and-hold model to one in which 
they would buy mortgages, package them into so-called mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and 
sell them. They gave these MBSs their corporate guarantee of timely payment of principal and 
interest. By selling these types of securities, the GSEs were able to pass on the interest rate risk 
(including the possibility that borrowers would prepay their mortgages) to the investors, although 
                                                 
3 In more recent years, some banks, as well as other mortgage companies, have been able to raise additional funds by 
issuing equity and debt obligations. (One proposal, discussed below, would make it easier for banks to borrow 
money through the use of covered bonds, which are backed by mortgages or other debt instruments as well as by the 
credit of the issuing bank.) 
4 Note that, given the demand for mortgages today and the level of bank deposits, it would be impossible for banks 
alone to provide the necessary funding. People have shifted their savings from banks into money markets, mutual 
funds, and other investments, and thus the share of U.S. financial assets held by banks has fallen. Meanwhile, the 
demand for home mortgages has grown faster than the economy as a whole. As of the end of 2009, total mortgage 
debt outstanding stood at $14.2 trillion dollars (Federal Reserve 2010), whereas total bank deposits within the 
United States totaled $7.5 trillion (Federal Deposit Insurance Commission 2009). As for the growth of mortgage 
debt relative to GDP, see http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/27/news/mortgage.overhang.fortune/index.htm. 
5 Also, GNMA has limited its backing to three types of investment vehicles, thus helping to ensure that the markets 
for these three types of securities will be both broad and deep. 
6 Fannie (and then Freddie) were still able to buy FHA and VA loans but did not do much of it. 
  3
they kept the credit risk.7 The GSEs were able to structure their securities to allow investors to 
manage interest rate risk by allocating the streams of interest and principal payments into 
different tranches, each with their own expected payment and maturity schedules. 
 
Although the U.S. government has refrained from explicitly guaranteeing GSE corporate 
obligations, investors have generally assumed that GSE obligations are backed by the federal 
government.8 A combination of the firms’ congressional charters, large size, and special 
regulatory treatment (such as exemption from both state and local taxes and some securities 
laws) has, over the years, signaled to investors that the government would not allow the firms to 
default on their obligations—hence the “implicit” guarantee.9 The GSEs did not have to pay any 
fee for this implicit guarantee, though presumably the government expected the savings 
generated by their lower borrowing costs to be put toward public purposes.10 With the implicit 
backing of the federal government, the two agencies were able to sell these securities to 
investors, including banks, which were willing to take the interest rate risk (the risk that interest 
rates on liabilities will increase above the rates on assets as well as the risk that falling interest 
rates will cause significant prepayments) but not the credit risk of the underlying mortgages.  
 
In fact, with the implicit federal guarantee, the GSEs were able to price and market the securities 
even before the mortgages that backed them were created. This forward market, or TBA (“to be 
announced”) market, in which the GSE MBSs are traded even before the underlying mortgage 
loans are specifically identified, helped borrowers to lock in rates in advance of closing their 
loans (see Davidson and Sanders 2009). The existence of the guarantee has been crucial to the 
TBA market, because investors are unlikely to be willing to buy securities with credit risk when 
the underlying loans are not specified.11 The standardization of documents and procedures that 
lie behind the GSE MBSs has also helped to increase investor confidence in the TBA market. 
This confidence, together with the overall scale of the TBA markets, has helped to make these 
MBSs attractive investments.  
 
                                                 
7 The interest rate risk is discussed in Jaffee (2003). Rising interest rates made Fannie’s net worth in the early 1980s 
negative (11), as the value of their portfolios fell below the values of their outstanding debt obligations (Frame and 
White 2005). 
8 The banks also receive a form of guarantee through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation but are charged a 
fee for that insurance. FDIC insurance protects deposits below a certain level, which facilitate bank portfolio 
lending.  
9 See Fannie Mae 1992 [hereinafter Fannie Mae Charter]. See especially § 304(e) (regarding exemptions from SEC 
requirements) and § 309(c)2 (regarding exemption from state and local taxation). In the case of Fannie Mae, five of 
its eighteen board members were appointed annually by the President of the United States. § 308(b). 
10 For more information on their regulatory advantages and implicit guarantee, see Frame and White 2005, Reiss 
2008, Quigley 2006, Quigley and Jaffee 2007, and Ambrose and King 2002, among others. 
11 A TBA market is not possible in most debt markets, because debt investors typically are not willing to pay for 
debt when the credit risk is unknown. A TBA market is possible for GSE MBSs because investors are confident that 
the issuing agencies will eliminate credit risk for the as-yet-unspecified underlying loans, as a result of the implicit 
government guarantees and perhaps the quality of their underwriting of the individual loans. By removing credit risk 
in this way, the TBA market allows investors to focus only on interest rate risk. Some observers think the TBA 
market will collapse without government guarantees (implicit or explicit), because investors will not buy MBSs that 
require them to bear unknown credit risk. And without the TBA market, originators would face the risk that interest 
rates will rise in the window between when they write a loan and when they can re-sell it to the GSEs. While there 
are other ways to hedge most of this risk, they would probably result in higher cost to the borrower. 
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In the early years of the 21st century, the private-label securities (PLS) market blossomed, 
attracting even more funds and investors to the housing market.12 These PLSs were generally 
backed by residential mortgages that neither Fannie nor Freddie was willing or able to buy—
generally what are referred to as nonprime or subprime mortgages. But PLSs had no government 
backing, so they were structured to deal with credit risk. Typically a PLS is divided into 
tranches, each with different priorities for the pass-through of the interest and principal payments 
from borrowers/mortgagors. Those tranches that are first in the “waterfall” to receive payment 
were the highest-rated (often AAA); those last in the waterfall were often rated below investment 
grade and often had to be retained by the issuer in the absence of investor interest.  
 
The PLS market was lightly regulated, and the riskiness of the securities (and their underlying 
mortgages) was underestimated by investors, as well as the ratings agencies they relied on.13 The 
result was that demand from investors was high, and the originators of these non-agency 
mortgages were able to offer borrowers products with little scrutiny of their ability or willingness 
to pay. Many of these products had low introductory rates (or even options to allow borrowers to 
choose how much they wish to pay each month, with the remaining interest costs added to the 
principal—called negative amortization) and adjustable rates that exploded after the first two or 
three years.  
 
As a result of this new and aggressive competition from the PLS market, the GSEs saw their 
market share erode.14 In response, the GSEs loosened their underwriting guidelines to buy 
mortgages of borrowers with lower credit scores and lower documentation of income and assets 
(the latter are generally referred to as Alt-A mortgages). After the issuance of new private-label 
MBSs collapsed in the third quarter of 2007, the share of the market held by the GSEs rebounded 
to roughly 70 percent by 2009.  
 
In addition to the guarantee business, Fannie and Freddie also generated profits over the years by 
holding direct investments in their portfolios. Specifically, by issuing more corporate debt, 
Fannie and Freddie were able to purchase whole loans, their own MBSs, as well as the AAA 
tranches of PLSs. Until recently, the GSEs were even permitted to invest in non-housing 
investments like tobacco company bonds.15 Because the implied government backing allowed 
them to borrow at artificially low interest rates, the GSEs were able to earn especially high 
margins on their portfolio investments, encouraging them to maintain and grow their portfolios. 
Low capital requirements (2.5 percent) allowed the GSEs to leverage their capital at 40:1 and 
thereby transform these high profit margins into high rates of return on capital (Frame and White 
2005, 170).16 
                                                 
12 While a PLS market had existed for years and had been backed mainly by well-performing prime jumbo 
mortgages, the growth came mainly from securities backed by much riskier subprime and Alt-A mortgages. 
13 Experience since 2007 has shown that even the highest-rated securities were much riskier than expected, and 
many of those issued in years 2005–2007 have been significantly downgraded. See Coval, Jurek, and Stafford 
(2008).  
14 Fannie and Freddie’s combined market share in the mortgage market was at 55 percent in 2003; this sank 
dramatically to under 35 percent by 2006, as the PLS came to dominate the market (Lockhart 2009, 2).  
15 Freddie Mac briefly invested in tobacco company bonds in the late 1990s. The rationale for allowing non-housing 
portfolio investments was that it permitted the firms to diversify, which arguably improved their stability.  
16 For their guarantee business, the GSEs only needed a capital ratio of 0.45, allowing even greater leverage (Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 2003). 
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The standard critique of GSE portfolios is that they exposed the firms (and implicitly, taxpayers) 
to interest rate risk (unlike their MBS business, which sold interest rate risk to investors). In 
terms of credit risk, the firms’ charters set the same underwriting standards for both MBS and 
portfolio investments: “[they] shall be confined, so far as practicable, to mortgages which are 
deemed by the corporation to be of such quality, type, and class as to meet, generally, the 
purchase standards imposed by private institutional mortgage investors.”17 However, while the 
written standard was the same for MBS and portfolio operations, they did not contain the same 
mix of underlying products (i.e., only their portfolios were vulnerable to PLS subprime risk). It 
may simply be true that the GSE risk managers were not able to obtain as much information on 
the quality of the underlying mortgages backing the securities purchased for the portfolio, 
thereby increasing uncertainty and exacerbating risks. 
 
Before 2003, GSE portfolios performed quite well. Until that year, their portfolios were 
comprised largely of conforming, prime loans that met “high” underwriting standards. Between 
2003 and 2007, the GSEs started buying AAA-rated private-label tranches of subprime MBSs 
and whole Alt-A loans for their portfolios.18 (The firms also guaranteed and securitized some 
Alt-A debt to investors as MBSs.) While it appears that the primary impetus for their movement 
into risky, non-prime investments was the higher interest rates that these investments paid, there 
is considerable debate about whether the GSEs were also motivated by their need to meet the 
affordability goals mandated by Congress (see Wallison and Calomiris 2009; Stein 2008). 
Established by the Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 and 
defined and enforced by HUD, the goals set targets for the share of loans purchased by the GSEs 
that should be made to low-income individuals and in low-income neighborhoods. Clearly, the 
goals made investments in securities backed by subprime loans that had been targeted to low 
income borrowers and neighborhoods easier to justify. 
 
While the bulk of their operations have involved single-family mortgages, the GSEs have also 
been key investors and, at times, innovators in the multifamily mortgage market. Before entering 
conservatorship, the firms were the largest players in the market for purchasing and securitizing 
multifamily loans, responsible for almost one third of all outstanding multifamily debt (Joint 
Center for Housing Studies 2009, 7). Their involvement dates back to the 1970s, when Freddie 
Mac pioneered securitization of multifamily loans. Their participation in the market started to 
grow fairly steadily in the mid-1990s, perhaps in part as a result of the establishment of the 
affordable housing goals, which rewarded the GSEs for expanding their investments in 
multifamily housing. The expansion in the past decade has been particularly notable. Between 
1999 and 2008, the GSEs’ direct holdings and guarantees increased from 16.9 percent of the total 
                                                 
17 See Fannie Mae Charter; Freddie Mac (2009) [hereinafter Freddie Mac Charter].  
18According to Geithner (2010), while in 2000, the GSEs held a negligible amount of private label securities backed 
by subprime or Alt A loans, by 2007, 23 percent of the GSEs portfolios was made up by PLS backed by subprime or 
Alt-A loans. See also, from Wallison and Calomiris (2009, 77): “There are few data available publicly on the dollar 
amount of junk loans held by the GSEs in 2004, but according to their own reports, GSE purchases of these 
mortgages and MBS increased substantially between 2005 and 2007. Subprime and Alt-A purchases during this 
period were a higher share of total purchases than in previous years. For example, Fannie reported that mortgages 
and MBS of all types originated in 2005–2007 comprised 49.8 percent of its overall book of single-family 
mortgages, which includes both mortgages and MBS retained in their portfolio as well as mortgages they securitized 
and guaranteed.”  
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outstanding multifamily debt to almost one third (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 2001, viii; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2009, 7).  
 
These multifamily rental units have been an important source of affordable housing. The average 
renter has a significantly lower income than the average homeowner. One estimate suggests that 
90 percent of the multifamily units financed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over the past 
fifteen years have been affordable to families earning incomes below the median in their 
metropolitan area (Dewitt 2010).  
 
Notably, the GSEs appear to have played an important counter-cyclical role in the multifamily 
market, providing some back-stop for the multifamily market during economic downturns. 
During both the 1989–1993 downturn, and between 2007–2008, the GSEs increased their 
purchases of multifamily mortgages, just as private investors withdrew (National Multifamily 
Council 2009; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2009). In the current market, the GSEs hold 35 
percent of total outstanding multifamily mortgage debt and are providing nearly 90 percent of all 
mortgage capital to the market. The GSEs have managed to provide this capital while still 
ensuring high loan performance. Over the past two decades, defaults in their multifamily 
portfolio have been fairly minimal. Even at the end of 2009, the delinquency rate on GSE 
multifamily loans was roughly half of one percent, fourteen times lower than defaults in the 
CMBS market (Dewitt 2010). That said, their involvement has not always been consistent. Most 
notably, Freddie withdrew completely from the multifamily business for a period in the early 
1990s (National Multifamily Council 2009).  
 
While the GSEs are recognized for their work in creating and standardizing common multifamily 
loan documents (HUD 2001), they retain a majority of their multifamily loans in their portfolios. 
In the middle of 2008, just prior to conservatorship, 62 percent of the GSEs’ multifamily loans 
were retained in their portfolios. By contrast, only 7 percent of their single-family loans were 
held in their portfolios (National Multifamily Council 2009). It is not clear whether the GSEs 
held a majority of their multifamily loans in portfolio because of the difficulty of securitizing the 
loans and/or finding investors, or because it was simply more profitable for them to retain them 
because of their higher yields and the common inclusion of pre-payment penalties or “yield 
maintenance agreements,” which mitigated the interest-rate risk of prepayment. 
 
Leadership in the development of products and underwriting standards has been very important 
in helping build a secondary market for multifamily housing (see, e.g., HUD 2009, viii; Green 
and Schnare 2009, 3, 16). However, the GSEs have resisted funding or purchasing multifamily 
loans of less than $5 million and did little to help stimulate this market. The economics of this 
part of the market is difficult because of the fixed costs of underwriting, which cannot easily be 
made up in fees. Without a nationally competitive primary or secondary market product to 
enable these projects to access fixed-rate financing, these small loans often have had to be 
structured as adjustable rate, balloon mortgages. 
 
In addition to their role in purchasing multifamily mortgages, the GSEs have played an important 
role in providing equity capital for the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program. The GSEs 
invested in Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) projects across the country, and as of 
2007, the GSEs accounted for almost 40 percent of the LIHTC investment market. This 
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investment structure allowed the GSEs to invest in multifamily housing while reducing their tax 
exposure. Because the GSEs are no longer profitable, they do not need such a tax shelter. Indeed, 
given their large holdings, they are unlikely to need the level of tax shelter being provided by 
these investments for some time, even if they become profitable again (Timiraos 2009).  
The GSEs have also been large purchasers of state housing finance bonds, which typically target 
first-time homebuyers.19 They have also partnered with such non-profits as Self-Help and 
foundations like the Ford Foundation to expand the secondary market for loans to low- and 
moderate-income borrowers. The GSEs have also been involved in philanthropic activities. In 
2007, the GSEs contributed $47 million to non-profits in Washington D.C., while the Fannie 
Mae Foundation (before it was dismantled and moved back into the corporation) supported 
financial education, housing research, and non-profits across the country. It is also worth noting 
that under conservatorship, the GSEs have been charged with overseeing the government-
subsidized loan modifications in the wake of the foreclosure crisis (HAMP).  
 
Taken as a whole, the pre-conservatorship structure of the two firms provided some significant 
benefits to both the single- and multifamily housing markets: 
 
− The firms improved liquidity by creating a national secondary market for single-
family mortgage credit that significantly reduced regional differences in credit access. 
Several factors contributed to the liquidity of the GSEs’ MBSs, including the 
standardization of the MBS structure and documents, effective mortgage pooling 
procedures, the large size of GSE MBS issuances, decades of marketing and brand-
building, the structure of the TBA MBS market, and the perception by investors that 
the firms’ obligations were backed by the U.S. government.20 
 
− The implied government backing of GSEs is often credited with preserving the 30-
year fixed-rate, self-amortizing, no-prepayment-penalty mortgage as an affordable 
standard within the United States.21 With credit risk eliminated, investors have only 
needed to worry about interest rate and prepayment risk, both of which can now be 
hedged in myriad ways and which have been structured into tranches to appeal to a 
wide range of investor appetites for risk. The result has been that borrowers have 
available a product that is safer than others because of its constant payments, thus 
eliminating one of the causes of default, and also allows the borrower to refinance if 
interest rates should fall.  
                                                 
19 The GSEs play a major role in enhancing the credit of state Housing Finance Agency bonds. For instance, in 2008 
in New York, the GSEs enhanced the credit of $4 billion in HFA bonds, out of $10 billion issued (see New York 
State Housing Finance Agency 2008; National Council of State Housing Agencies 2010).  
20 Liquidity of an asset is ease with which it can be converted into cash without a price discount. While this 
definition sounds simple, the concept is deceptively subtle, and the many factors that can affect liquidity are not 
intuitive. In choosing between two assets with identical risk profiles but different liquidity, investors are willing to 
pay a significant premium to buy the more liquid assets. One of the major factors in creating liquidity for debt 
products is simply the size of the market: larger markets are more liquid because there are more buyers and sellers.  
21 The rationale for this claim is that originators may refuse to write long-term, fixed-rate mortgages without the 
assurance that their potential losses are guaranteed. International comparisons suggest that while most other national 
governments do not provide guarantee in their mortgage finance systems, they also lack long-term, fixed-rate no-
prepayment penalty mortgages. 
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− The development of standard underwriting criteria and mortgage products which 
allowed both large and small originators to sell loans to them and for borrowers 
across the country to have access to some basic products including the 30-year, fixed-
rate product with its level payments. The GSEs have also helped to set standards for 
servicing agreements. Early in the subprime crisis when clarity was needed around 
how servicers should interpret pooling and servicing agreements, the GSEs 
established the requisite standard industry practice. 
 
− Until 2007, as a result of the federal backing, the firms helped to provide 
countercyclical stability to the secondary market, preserving wide access to 
mortgage credit during recession in the early 1980s, the recession in the early 1990s, 
the Asian financial crisis and Long Term Capital Management collapse in the late 
1990s, and the recession in 2001 (Quigley 2006; Peak and Wilcox 2006). (The firms 
are currently providing substantial liquidity to the mortgage market, but only because 
of the injection of hundreds of billions of dollars in government capital, and because 
the Federal Reserve was, until April 1, 2010, buying over 80 percent of the agencies’ 
MBSs in a $1.25 trillion buying plan [Andrews 2009; see also Federal Reserve Bank 
2009].)  
 
− Their large size and the fact that there were only two made it easier to take them into 
conservatorship. Their charters also give federal policy makers more leverage to 
encourage modifications and refinancing of GSE loans during market downturns, and 
they have helped to oversee the HAMP program.  
 
− The firms have played an important role in providing capital to the multifamily 
mortgage market through portfolio investments, and in developing new forms of 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) that were more appealing to 
investors, who have traditionally seen multifamily mortgages as non-standardized and 
risky (DiPasquale and Cummings 1992; Segal and Szymanoski 1998). 
 
− The GSEs’ congressionally-mandated affordability goals may have encouraged 
lending in underserved markets, but the degree to which the goals have provided 
support for safe and sound products for low-income borrowers is debated.22 
 
− They formed partnerships that allowed state housing finance agencies and such not-
for-profit lenders as the Community Preservation Corporation in New York, Self-
Help, and the Enterprise Community Investment division of Enterprise Community 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Bostic and Gabriel (2006) (examining the impacts of GSE loan purchasing activities in targeted 
communities). See also An et al. (2007) (examining the impact of GSE as well as FHA activities in these 
communities). Some critics have pointed to the affordable housing goals as a main culprit in the GSEs’ insolvency, 
particularly after 2004 when the GSEs were allowed to count risky private-label subprime MBSs held in their 
portfolios towards their affordable housing goals. But the evidence is not strong. A recent Federal Reserve paper 
found that while the affordable housing goals did little for the intended low-income beneficiaries, there was also no 
evidence that the goals led the GSEs to take greater risks (Bhutta 2009).  
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Partners to access cheaper financing and developed specialized loan products—both 
single- and multifamily—to provide financing for affordable housing. 
 
The GSEs’ pre-conservatorship structure also had disadvantages: 
 
− The existence of the implicit federal guarantee made the GSEs susceptible to moral 
hazard by tempting their executives and shareholders to take on excessive risk and 
expand their portfolios beyond what was needed to provide a reliable secondary 
market and meet mission requirements. Besides threatening their solvency, the two 
firms’ high-risk investments may have worsened the recent unsustainable rise in 
housing prices that occurred between 2003 and 2006. 
 
− In addition, the pursuit of profits as a result of the firms’ private ownership made it 
difficult not to respond to the inroads being made by the PLS market. The result was 
a race to the bottom as the firms tried to preserve their market share by lowering 
underwriting standards. (In the face of the same competitive pressure, FHA saw its 
market share fall from 19 percent to 6 percent from 1996 to 2005 [GAO 2007].) 
 
− Their higher leverage, lower capital requirements, and lower cost of funds allowed 
the GSEs to attract investment dollars away from other sources of finance for housing 
(e.g., the traditional thrift business) and from other sectors of the economy, resulting 
in the creation of a net bias toward investing in housing in the economy overall.  
 
− The firms’ political power and questionable congressional lobbying activities allowed 
them to exert some control over both Congress and their regulator and evade proper 
oversight (Wallison and Calomiris 2009; McKinley 1997). One key example is the 
firms’ low capital requirements. Although the regulators had raised the requirements 
by 30 percent following the discovery of accounting and other deficiencies in the 
GSEs, they were in the process of lowering them back toward the statutory minimums 
just in advance of the GSEs being taken into conservatorship. The lack of sufficient 
capital played a major role in their near-insolvency and conservatorship. 
 
− The two firms may have suppressed competition by exerting duopoly power and 
dominating the prime MBS market.23 Lower price competition may have allowed the 
GSEs to retain more of the implicit subsidy resulting from lower borrowing costs and 
pass less of the benefits on in the form of lower interest rates for borrowers. Estimates 
vary, but it appears that only about half of the savings due were passed on to 
borrowers with a similar share retained by the GSEs themselves (Jaffee and Quigley 
2007). Less competition may have also dampened the incentive to innovate. 
 
                                                 
23 However, there may be economies of scale that make concentration in the MBS market desirable. In particular, 
the presence of a few dominant players in the secondary market makes it easier to set standards that provide clear 
information to investors (and lenders and borrowers). The presence of a few large players and a limited set of 
products may also encourage a high trading volume, which aids liquidity.  
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− The GSEs’ large size served to concentrate systemic risks and arguably made them 
too big to be allowed to fail, because their insolvency could threaten the entire 
economy.24  
 
In short, the pre-conservatorship structure of the GSEs had some significant strengths but also 
considerable weaknesses. While improvements to the structure of the GSEs can surely be 
justified, it would be a mistake to assume that simply reforming the GSEs, without reforms to the 
private-label market, would prevent another crisis. While the implicit government guarantee may 
have encouraged the growth of their portfolios beyond what was required for a healthy secondary 
market and pushed the GSEs to buy a much greater share of subprime MBS, the GSEs were not 
the primary cause of the bubble.25 Subprime lending increased between 2003 and 2006, a time 
period when the GSEs lost almost half of their market share to private label firms. Moreover, 
while the amount of private-label subprime MBSs purchased by the GSEs between 2005 and 
2007 was significant, it still only amounted to a small share of the total subprime securities 
purchased by the market. According to FHFA Director James Lockhart, the two firms owned 
$170 billion of subprime mortgages in AAA tranches of private label securities, representing 
about 11 percent of the total outstanding subprime debt (Lockhart 2007, 13). It was private-label 
MBS issuers that were driving the market for non-prime mortgage debt.  
                                                 
24 Of course, many of the other private financial institutions, such as JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, which 
would likely step in to play a more active role in the secondary market if the GSEs were dismantled, have arguably 
also become “too big to fail.” In fact, even if the GSEs continue to operate with an implicit (or even explicit) 
government guarantee, they arguably do not have a unique competitive advantage, because private institutions are 
seen as having an “implicit” guarantee as well. 
25 The actual extent of the GSE contribution through non-prime investments to housing bubble inflation is debated. 
For example, Tatom (2008) notes: “As recently as 2007, Freddie and Fannie restricted their purchases of mortgages 
to about 15 percent of the market, as noted by Poole 2008, with no obvious effect on housing, mortgage or financial 
markets.” Nevertheless, others note that their sheer size quite possibly contributed to some part of the current crisis. 
According to Jaffee et al. (2009b): “By 2007, over 15 percent of their own outstanding mortgage portfolio was 
invested in non-prime assets, an amount representing 10 percent of the entire market for these assets. While not the 
only institutional culprit here, it is reasonable to assume that the mere size of the GSEs created “froth” and “excess” 
liquidity in the market.”  
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II. GOALS AND FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 
In considering options for reform of the GSEs, policy makers should start with the basic goals of 
the secondary market as part of the overall housing finance market. For the purposes of this 
analysis, we assume that the laws against discrimination and unfair and deceptive practices are 
being enforced and that the risks inherent in different mortgage products are transparent to 
borrowers and so-called toxic products are generally not available. The following broad 
principles seem essential:  
 
− Access to Liquid Credit Markets Nationwide. The primary goal of a secondary 
market is to ensure a deep and broad market for mortgage-backed securities that 
provide financing for both single-family and multifamily borrowers across the 
country.26 Higher debt liquidity helps ensure a reliable and consistent source of 
capital. It reduces variations across regions in rates and availability for the same 
mortgage products, and results in better pricing of securities and ultimately lower 
mortgage rates for borrowers.  
 
− Counter-Cyclical Stability. The secondary market should help to ensure consistent 
access to credit throughout economic cycles. The secondary market should provide 
credit during downturns to help stabilize the housing finance market and should 
protect taxpayers from unnecessary bailouts. In addition, the secondary market should 
not encourage the over-supply/availability of credit or aggressive underwriting during 
periods of expansion. Finally, a well-functioning secondary market should not 
exacerbate the impact of an economic downturn by impeding the ability of servicers 
to modify loans or authorize short sales to help avoid unnecessary foreclosures.  
 
− Availability of Safe Products that are Well-Priced and Clearly Understood by 
Borrowers and Investors. Some mortgage products are less prone to default than 
others. Given that these products minimize the risk of harm not only to borrowers but 
also to their children and neighborhoods, government has an interest in ensuring that 
they are available and widely used. An example might be the 30-year, self-
amortizing, fixed-rate mortgage with the option to pre-pay. Monthly payments are 
both predictable and stable for the full life of the mortgage. Also, it is important to be 
able to pass on to borrowers the benefit of the more favorable rates obtainable in the 
secondary market because of the federal guarantee. 
 
− Provision of Credit for the Underserved. The secondary market should help ensure 
that appropriate products and resources are available—both for single- and 
multifamily mortgages—in markets that would otherwise be underserved because of 
misconceptions about the degree of credit risk, thinly-traded markets, or because of 
higher origination costs or lower fees (e.g., smaller loans that may not be any harder 
                                                 
26 Offering financing across the country does not necessarily mean that mortgages should be priced identically 
across the country. The cost to borrowers also needs to reflect local variations in such factors as the foreclosure 
process and the ability of the mortgagee to collect personally on the debt. The costs of such variations in risk and 
servicing costs should be built into the price of a mortgage, or otherwise some borrowers will get somewhat of a free 
ride by being able to shift these incremental costs onto others.  
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to originate will generate less revenue from a given amount of upfront points or the 
same interest rate margin.)  
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING REFORMS 
Before evaluating any particular proposals, it is useful to articulate a framework through which 
to compare and contrast them. We lay out nine characteristics that distinguish different models of 
the secondary market, indicating in each case how critical that feature is to meeting the goals laid 
out above.  
A. Credit Enhancement 
It would likely be impossible to meet all of the above goals without some form of government 
credit enhancement. Since the Great Depression, insurance and guarantees provided by the U.S. 
government have come to play a large role in the mortgage finance system—both for single- and 
multifamily properties. These guarantees encourage investment in housing by protecting 
investors against losses. Guarantees have come in many forms: insurance of individual 
mortgages through the FHA, FDIC-insurance of bank deposits that are used for mortgage 
lending, and implicit guarantees of the corporate obligations of the GSEs and of the Federal 
Home Loan banks.  
 
The experience of Fannie and Freddie has shown that a government backing (albeit implicit) can 
help to ensure a deep, liquid market for their mortgage products and provide countercyclical 
stability.27 Some observers credit government guarantees with the ongoing viability of both the 
30-year, fixed-rate, no-prepayment-penalty mortgage and the TBA market. Certainly, such 
backing also helps ensure that the securities are well-priced and thereby can reduce the costs to 
borrowers of financing the purchase of a home (i.e., as affordable as possible short of the 
government providing a direct monetary subsidy).  
 
As is the case with Ginnie Mae, a single guarantor has the ability to bring a degree of 
standardization of products and securities available in the marketplace and to limit both the types 
of mortgages and the types of securities eligible for its credit enhancement. 28 Such standards 
help to reduce information costs for investors and create more liquid markets. Standardization 
generally reduces an investor’s uncertainty about precisely what s/he is buying, and thereby leads 
to higher MBS prices and lower mortgage rates. Further, standardization helps to aggregate 
markets that, with high trading volume, would tend to be more liquid because buyers are more 
confident that they can later sell their securities. Thus, in addition to reducing investors’ 
exposure to credit and systemic risk, a program of government enhancement can provide 
liquidity and systemic stability to the secondary mortgage market, especially during downturns 
and times of crisis. 
 
                                                 
27 In retrospect, the temporary explosion of a highly-liquid market for non-agency securities was made possible by a 
failure to properly understand the risk inherent in the products backing those securities. The liquidity available in 
this market evaporated at the onset of the subprime bust and overall credit crunch. 
28 In contrast to the standardization that Ginnie Mae brought to the market for its MBSs (and the standardization of 
FHA and VA mortgage products which backed these MBSs), the government left it to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
to drive the standardization of the market for their own securities and their own mortgage products.  
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Of course, like all forms of insurance, however, any guarantees in the secondary mortgage 
market carry the possibility of encouraging moral hazard. With a guarantee, neither the buyers of 
government-backed securities nor the aggregators of the loans will be as motivated to scrutinize 
the quality of the loans that collateralize the security unless the latter also have exposure to 
losses, either because they face a risk of losing capital or their ability to issue more securities in 
the future. Skeptics question whether any regulatory system can adequately prevent imprudent 
risk-taking in the presence of government guarantees.29 Requiring lenders and securitizers to 
retain some degree of liability in the event of a loss could moderate the moral hazard. The 
liability could come in the form of having to take the first loss up to some percent of the loan 
amount. In addition, an additional layer of oversight might be helpful to monitor both the type 
and quality of the loans being securitized as well as counterparty risks (e.g., making sure the 
providers of loan-level insurance have adequate capital and that the other players in the 
origination chain are performing their roles properly). Anything short of this level of oversight 
and monitoring could leave the taxpayers unnecessarily exposed. Policymakers should think 
carefully about whether the basic regulatory system overseeing the GSEs should take on this 
additional due diligence.  
i. Guaranteeing MBS vs. Corporate Debt 
While the implicit credit enhancement for Fannie and Freddie was assumed to apply to their 
corporate debt and perhaps to equity investors as well, a credit enhancement that applies only to 
MBSs would likely yield the same benefits for the mortgage market and much less of the risk. In 
fact, the success of Ginnie Mae demonstrates that providing a government “wrap” only for the 
securities themselves is sufficient.30 Rather than guaranteeing the underlying mortgage debt, or 
the corporate obligations of the issuer, the government should merely guarantee MBS holders 
timely payment of principal and interest in the case of default. These guarantees would be 
provided only if underlying loans met pre-specified underwriting standards and the securitizers 
themselves are sufficiently at risk and sufficiently capitalized. Some research suggests that 
guarantees of MBS issues, as Ginnie Mae provides, can be even more effective in lowering 
interest rates than guarantees of individual mortgages.31 
 
A key benefit of limiting the guarantee to the MBSs only is that it would reduce the incentive 
that Fannie and Freddie have had to continually increase the size of their portfolios in order to 
fuel their profits. Without a guarantee on corporate debt, they would not have benefited from 
artificially-low funding costs and high margins in their portfolio investments. (See discussion 
below of other possible uses for a portfolio). 
                                                 
29 The situation is somewhat different for Ginnie Mae since the mortgages in its securities are insured or guaranteed 
by other government agencies, which oversee the quality of those mortgages. While FHA insurance covers 
essentially all of the losses from a foreclosure, the VA’s guaranty covers only 25–50 percent of the original loan 
amount (General Accounting Office 1997).  
30 It should be noted that the individual mortgages backing GNMA securities are in fact insured by through other 
federal programs such as FHA and VA. 
31 “Ginnie Mae securitizes already federally-insured mortgages made through FHA. The additional guarantee of 
timely payment of interest and principal from Ginnie Mae was a small extension of the federal backing. But the 
results were dramatic: the creation of Ginnie Mae lowered FHA borrowing rates by sixty to eighty basis points. With 
the real, long-term mortgage interest rates in the region of 4 to 5 percent, this was a large, not small, change. This 
seemingly small transformation of a federally-insured mortgage into a federally-insured liquid security made a big 
change in the cost of homeownership” (Woodward and Hall 2009). 
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ii. Explicit vs. Implicit Guarantee  
Guarantees can be either made explicit or left implicit. Implicit guarantees are by definition 
ambiguous. This lack of clarity reduces the effectiveness of the guarantee because investors call 
the guarantee into question during precisely the times when it is most needed to preserve 
liquidity and reassure investors, and because any uncertainty adds to the rate spread over 
treasuries. Moving to an explicit guarantee would allow the securities to trade at prices more like 
the government’s direct obligations and so help to make borrowing more affordable. 
 
A commonly-voiced worry about explicit guarantees is their implications for the level of U.S. 
national debt.32 One of the purposes for spinning off Fannie Mae as a private corporation in 1968 
was to keep its liabilities off the federal balance sheet and its annual expenditures out of the 
federal budget (Congressional Budget Office 2010). But in fact, if an appropriate risk-adjusted 
fee is charged for each MBS that receives the government wrap, then the impact on the federal 
budget would be neutral.33 In theory at least, these fees could be kept in a reserve that would be 
sufficient to cover any future government liabilities. However, making the GSE guarantees 
explicit with regard to the already existing obligations of the two agencies would initially lead to 
an increase in federal liabilities based on an assessment of their likely losses based on their 
current holdings (Congressional Budget Office 2010). 
 
If policymakers decide on moving to an explicit guarantee, they also need to consider whether 
they should require insured parties to pay actuarially-sound fees in exchange for the guarantee. 
Charging for the government guarantee would raise all mortgage rates, estimated by some to be 
on the order of twenty-five to fifty basis points for single-family mortgages.34 Charging such a 
fee for both single- and multifamily MBSs would eliminate any implicit subsidy resulting from 
the government guarantee, a subsidy that has favored housing over other sectors of the economy. 
iii. Which Types of Mortgages Should Be Included in Federally Credit-Enhanced MBSs? 
While some credit enhancement is critical to meet the objectives outlined above, guarantees do 
not need to be provided for every type of mortgage. Sufficient liquidity and systemic stability 
can probably be accomplished through a combination of credit enhancement for a small number 
of “favored” mortgage products and regulation of the PLS market (see discussion of regulation 
below). A side benefit of having such favored products is that they would gain a price advantage 
in the market due to their lower funding costs and so have the salutary effect of encouraging 
more borrowers to choose these safe products.35 
 
Limiting the products eligible for enhancement also limits the government’s exposure to credit 
risks and minimizes the areas where regulation is needed to combat moral hazard (see discussion 
below). Of course, support for the mortgage market can be easily expanded to a broader range of 
                                                 
32 Of course, implicit guarantees are not free either, even if they are not called upon. Studies suggest that the U.S. 
government pays higher interest rates on its own debt than it would if the GSEs were fully private, because investors 
consider the GSEs corporate debt as an implied obligation of the U.S. government. 
33 Fannie and Freddie did in fact charge those who sold mortgages to them a fee for the privilege of getting their 
guarantee. 
34 See Quigley (2006) for a summary of studies that provided estimates of the mortgage subsidy to homeowners, as 
well as the yield spreads for the GSEs.  
35 Any pricing advantage will be reduced to the extent that other large mortgage originators or MBS issuers are 
judged by the capital markets as being “too big to fail” and so also receive favorable pricing for their debt. 
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mortgage products during the bad times, if desired, by simply extending the range of mortgage 
products eligible for the government wrap (as was done during the current crisis by raising the 
cap on the size of loans that the GSEs can guarantee). 
 
The decision on which mortgage products to guarantee might be based on some or all of the 
following criteria:  
 
− Which products should the government make sure are always available at as low a 
spread as possible above Treasuries, making them more affordable? 
 
− What products might not otherwise exist but have a broader social benefit because of 
their safe characteristics (e.g., the 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage with no prepayment 
penalty, or a low down payment loan that requires the borrower to complete a course 
on budgeting and homeownership)?  
 
− Which market sectors will be well-served by the private market during normal times? 
What size and type of loans?36  
 
− Which market sectors should be served by FHA, VA, and Ginnie Mae? Is there a 
need to have another source of mortgages for people with lower incomes (who 
presumably will borrow smaller amounts) and with a higher risk profile because of 
lower credit scores or higher loan-to-values resulting from smaller down payments? 
 
− Which types of multifamily financing products or underwriting standards should be 
encouraged and supported? 
 
The potential overlap or boundaries between markets to be served by government agencies, GSE 
successors and private firms needs to be carefully considered. The debate so far about the future 
of the GSEs has paid little attention to this topic. 
iv. Possible Roles of Government Guarantor 
As the ultimate source for funding losses, the government has an interest in the solvency, capital 
adequacy, and operational effectiveness of the aggregators and securitizers of the loans as well as 
an interest in the underwriting standards and the oversight of the originators of the loans. 
Therefore, it will be critical to ascertain whether the agency that is providing the guarantee will 
set the standards, monitor, and regulate each of these activities or whether other regulators or 
agencies will perform one or more of these functions. In the case of GNMA, it is the FHA and 
the VA that set the standards for the loans they guarantee and that monitor the operations of the 
entities that originate those loans. 
B. Regulation of All Players in the Mortgage Market 
The level and reach of regulation is also a critical to the proper functioning of the finance system. 
As we now understand, the GSEs lowered their underwriting standards and engaged in a race to 
                                                 
36 Consideration might also be given to varying the cap on loan size by region, depending on the median cost of a 
home. 
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the bottom as they tried to preserve their market share against competition from the PLS market, 
which was subject to much lighter regulation. Thus, a well-functioning housing system depends 
not only on effective regulation of the GSEs but also of other actors in the housing finance 
system.  
 
The industry needs to be regulated as to its underwriting standards, the quality of the 
underwriting process, operational risk, the level of capital/reserves, and even the quality of its 
servicing of the mortgage loans and the rating of its securities.37 The ability to regulate these 
entities effectively would be facilitated by requiring, for example, that all securitizers be licensed 
or chartered. Such a regulatory system/environment would help guard against the proliferation of 
toxic products, poor quality controls, and unfair and deceptive marketing practices, and thereby 
prevent the kind of race to the bottom that we have just witnessed, in which safer products are 
driven out of the market place. 
 
That said, regulation can be excessive. In rethinking the regulatory environment, it will be 
critical to find the right balance between disciplined oversight and sufficient flexibility to allow 
for innovation of consumer products, investment vehicles, and operations/systems/ 
technology/platforms.38 One case in point may be automated underwriting, which the GSEs 
helped to develop and to then make widely available. Too much regulation can arguably reduce 
competition, inhibit innovation, increase costs, and otherwise interfere with the discipline of 
market forces. Too little regulation, or minimal enforcement of regulations, can undermine 
public purposes and effective oversight of systemic risk issues. Maintaining a proper regulatory 
balance over time is very difficult.  
C. Securitization of Non-Favored Products  
Another overarching question is whether to allow non-favored mortgage products to be 
securitized at all, even if they meet other regulatory restrictions on underwriting standards and 
transparency to borrowers. If such securitization is not permitted, then access to capital for these 
products will be artificially restricted , as portfolio lenders such as banks are constrained in how 
much of each mortgage product they can hold in their portfolios. Shortages in supply are likely 
to lead to higher prices paid by borrowers. 
 
However, the decision to allow these products to be securitized means that these products will be 
able to compete more effectively with the favored products and so be able to capture a greater 
market share.39 If this competition puts at risk the viability of the securitizers of the favored 
products, then the system may no longer be able to offer counter-cyclical stability and certainly 
reduce the ability of those securitizers to cross-subsidize the provision of other socially desirable 
activities.40 Moreover, society may suffer if too few borrowers have mortgages that are as safe 
                                                 
37 The exemption of the GSEs from certain securities laws should also be examined. 
38 One possible option to build into a regulatory scheme to promote product innovation may be to explicitly allow 
for the testing of new products on a pilot basis to ascertain how they will perform over time. Those that perform well 
enough could then be approved for more general use.  
39 Differences in capital requirements can also tilt the playing field in one direction or the other as was shown by the 
competitive advantage of the high leverage allowed for the GSEs. 
40 A number of recent studies have found that foreclosed and abandoned properties also have a number of negative 
externalities including depressing the property values of surrounding properties and interfering with the education of 
the children in the families being displaced (Schuetz, Been, and Ellen 2009).  
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and sustainable as the favored products. In order to redress the balance, government may want to 
take further action to tip the scales back toward the favored products or at least to ensure that the 
regulatory system provides a more level playing field. 
 
The next question posed by allowing non-favored products to be securitized is whether to allow 
the same entity to issue both types of securities, those backed by favored products (and so can be 
sold with government backing) and those backed by non-favored ones. If a securitizer can only 
offer one or the other, then the danger exists that the one offering the favored products will be 
forced out of business by competition from the non-favored products. If a securitizer of the 
favored products goes out of business, then it will not be there during the downturns to help 
provide countercyclical support to the housing market. To guard against this possibility, it may 
be necessary to ensure that the set of favored products is able to hold its own throughout the 
business cycle and regardless of the steepness of the yield curve. For example, 30- and 15-year 
fixed-rate products become less attractive compared to ARMs as the differential between long- 
and short-term rates widens (this situation where long-term rates are much higher than short-term 
rates is referred to as a steep yield curve). If a securitizer can only issue MBSs backed by these 
fixed-rate products, then it could go out of business when the yield curve steepens. Without the 
ability to compete successfully in all types of markets, the securitizer might also have trouble 
raising private capital.  
 
On the other hand, if the same securitizers can issue both kinds of MBSs, then regulation 
becomes more complicated, especially if the government insurer sets higher standards for capital 
reserves and is unable to ensure that those reserves are walled off from any losses incurred on the 
non-favored MBSs. If the non-favored products start to perform poorly, thus depleting the capital 
of the securitizer, then the government insurer will become more exposed to loss on the credit-
enhanced MBSs. A worse scenario might be for the problems on the non-favored side to lead to 
failure of the business as a whole. The only way to protect against this might be to require the 
securitizer to have separate legal entities handling the two types of MBSs with separate pools of 
capital. 
D. Market Concentration 
Market concentration refers to the degree to which the secondary market is dominated by a few 
large institutions. One question posed by the range of proposals for reform of the secondary 
mortgage market is the right level of concentration. Is the presence of two players too few, just 
right or too many? Going forward, the government can, if it wants, set a maximum number by 
requiring the firms to be licensed or chartered and limiting the number that it will authorize. 
Alternatively, government can hold down the number of players simply by increasing the 
barriers to entry by, for example, setting high minimum capital requirements. 
 
There are a number of reasons for considering a limit on the number of firms. The strongest 
argument for concentration in any market is the existence of economies of scale. In some 
industries, the cost structure may make the optimal size of a firm quite large, and thus the 
optimal number of securitizers quite small. Another advantage of concentration is that it may 
make government interventions easier when markets collapse. For instance, the fact that only 
two firms controlled almost the entire prime mortgage market allowed the government to 
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efficiently/easily nationalize the secondary market system for prime mortgages during the 
financial crisis of September 2008. 
 
Because standardization has arisen in the presence of only two GSEs, it is sometimes assumed 
that concentration is necessary for standardization. However, even in a world with multiple 
securitizers, a single government insurance entity could drive standardization by imposing a 
single set of rules and standards for the products it insures.  
 
There are clearly some potential risks to industry concentration. For example, if the securitizers 
of non-favored products (or even banks that hold loans in portfolio) can raise money at lower 
costs because they are perceived as being “too big to fail,” then the government’s credit 
enhancement may do little to tip the scales toward the favored products. Especially in the wake 
of the government’s recent bailout efforts, it will be very difficult or impossible to convince 
market participants that large financial institutions do not have some kind of implicit guarantee. 
A number of proposals have been put forth for dealing with this issue, but the only credible way 
to disavow an implicit guarantee may be to reduce market concentration, and make sure no firm 
is “too big to fail.”  
 
Another potential downside of market concentrations is the challenge of preventing large and 
powerful regulated entities from capturing their regulator. That said, in a low-concentration 
market with many participants it may be easier to evade monitoring and game the regulatory 
system. Moreover, the challenge of having to regulate a large number of entities may lead the 
regulators to develop even more extensive and detailed guidelines and standards which in turn 
can impede innovation. Thus, the ultimate impact of market concentration on regulatory 
effectiveness is unclear. In truth, effective regulation is difficult, regardless of the level of market 
concentration. 
 
Separate from the impact of regulation, the rate of innovation can also vary based on market 
concentration. An environment with too few entities may not create the competitive pressures to 
develop new products and find ways to reduce costs. Multiple competitors are often thought to 
be more innovative although the innovation itself may be subject to high fixed costs and so may 
need to emanate from third party vendors who can capture the economies of scale. An example 
might be the development of software for new origination, production, or servicing platforms. 
E. A Duty to Serve: Serving the Underserved 
One critical aspect of a new housing finance system is the degree to which firms are expected to 
make loans in underserved communities. Markets can be underserved for a number of reasons—
each of which may best be addressed with a different approach. If they are underserved because 
of discrimination, then the parties involved should be subject to enforcement of existing fair 
lending laws. If they are underserved because of misinformation or misperception of risk, then an 
appropriate remedy might a regulation similar to the Community Reinvestment Act, which 
encourages lenders to explore serving such markets.41 However, if a market is underserved 
                                                 
41 The Community Reinvestment Act places an affirmative obligation (sometimes also referred to as a duty to serve) 
on banks to help meet the credit needs of lower income communities consistent with safety and soundness (see 
Willis 2009). 
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because of higher risk or higher origination costs, then more direct government intervention and 
subsidies may be called for.42  
 
Even if the market is underserved because of higher risk or costs, there are still questions about 
the appropriate intervention. In particular, the key question is whether the government should 
require private actors to serve these markets themselves or whether it should instead collect a fee 
from private actors and use it to support affordable housing through other means, such as was 
initially proposed for the National Housing Trust Fund. 43 On the one hand, many of the skills, 
expertise, and systems that the GSEs have are the same as those needed to serve these markets. 
And there have clearly been examples where the GSEs brought their resources to the table and 
created very productive partnerships with CDFIs and state housing finance agencies. On the 
other hand, imposing a social mission on a profit-making firm is fundamentally challenging 
(Willis 2009). Proposals for reforming the housing finance system need to be scrutinized for how 
they best balance these two approaches to serving the underserved.  
F. Financing Multifamily Rental 
Another critical consideration is the continued availability of credit for multifamily housing. The 
market for financing multifamily rental properties still remains a much more handcrafted 
business with each transaction having its own unique characteristics that are best understood and 
evaluated by specialized lenders.44 As a result, there is no mass-production approach to 
underwrite these deals (particularly those that have city, state, or federal dollars to help write 
down the costs to make the units affordable to low- and moderate-income families). By 
underwriting and either buying or guaranteeing these types of mortgages, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac have helped to bring a somewhat larger pool of capital for multifamily housing and 
reduced the price of credit in the process. 45  
 
As noted above, the GSEs have at times retained the majority of their multifamily loans in their 
portfolios rather than securitizing them. It is not clear whether the GSEs have held onto these 
loans because they find it advantageous due to the higher interest rates and thus higher margins 
of multifamily loans, or because they have found it difficult to securitize them, especially before 
multifamily buildings are fully rented and can demonstrate a consistent rental income. GSEs 
might also want to hold these loans in portfolio because it enables them to monitor and address 
the issues that inevitably arise with these more complicated deals, particularly for deals that have 
multiple participants. If the GSEs are holding onto these loans because investors are wary (or 
                                                 
42 Higher risk can exist because the population is more vulnerable to loss of job during downturns and has fewer 
savings to bridge the time until they get reemployed. If the required mortgage product is one with low down 
payment, then there is the higher risk that that the collateral may fall below the amount of the loan and thus be 
insufficient to make the lender whole. (Interestingly, lower income borrowers seem to have a high willingness to 
pay, perhaps even more than a middle-income borrower might have, since the purchase of a home is often 
considered a crucial first step on the way to the American Dream.) 
43 In addition, there are a number of options for imposing a tax or fee. For example, it could be imposed on each 
MBS, on the securitizers of those MBSs, or on a broader set of plays in the market. It could be based on revenues, 
profits, or the unit or dollar volume of mortgages in the MBS. 
44 The loans vary, for example, as to type of collateral, amortization schedule, and subordinated financing layers. 
There is a lack of generally available information about the historical performance of similar loans (see Segal and 
Szymanoski 1997).  
45 By 2008, Fannie and Freddie accounted for almost one-third of outstanding multifamily debt (Joint Center for 
Housing Studies 2009). 
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because there are transactional costs that make holding loans in portfolio desirable), then 
restrictions on portfolio purchases going forward may significantly reduce the availability of 
credit for multifamily mortgages.  
 
If instead, the GSEs have held onto the majority of multifamily loans simply because it is more 
profitable for them, then restrictions on the portfolio will have less impact.46 Given the 
uncertainty and the importance of the rental market in serving lower and moderate income 
households, policymakers may want to consider making exceptions for holdings of multifamily 
loans if portfolios are more strictly limited in the future (which many of the current proposals 
recommend). While even complicated multifamily deals may be expected to be securitized once 
a property is fully rented and has a few years of a consistent income stream, these loans may 
need to be held in portfolio until they can reach that point of stabilization. Proposals might even 
consider a specific mandate to purchase loans for affordable multifamily rental properties in 
underserved communities, given that the multifamily market requires more loan-by-loan 
handcrafting.  
 
It is worth noting that the GSEs have played a particularly important role in what has now 
become the largest subsidized housing production program, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) program. Through creating a set of standard products that lenders can offer to tax credit 
developments, they have brought a more stable and less expensive supply of loan funds to 
multifamily projects that rely on the LIHTC for part of their funding (Apgar and Narsimhan 
2006). They have also purchased tax credits themselves. Thus, in moving to a new model, 
policymakers should consider implications for the tax credit program.  
G. Allowing Direct Investments: the Ability to Hold Assets in a Portfolio 
Another issue is whether to allow the securitizers to maintain portfolios of mortgages, mortgage-
backed securities, and other investments. For the GSEs, their portfolios were a major source of 
profit as well as providing a way to maintain liquidity for mortgages in the face of short-term 
bumps in the MBS market. With low capital requirements and low cost of funds, the opportunity 
to earn more profit appears to have encouraged them to both grow their portfolios and take on 
more risk. Other proposed changes, such as the elimination of any implicit (or explicit) 
government guarantee of corporate debt and the imposition of higher capital requirements that 
may be more in line with those of other financial institutions such as banks’, will greatly reduce 
the profit potential and the ability to grow these portfolios and to take on more risk. It should be 
noted, however, that the loss of the outsized profits in a retained portfolios may limit the ability 
to cross-subsidize investments in affordable housing, and education and training for nonprofit 
providers. 
 
Even given these factors, explicit limits on the size of the portfolio may still make sense to 
prevent firms from growing large enough to constitute a systemic risk. Limits on the type of 
investments can help to reduce risk by restricting firms to holding only low-risk investments. 
However, allowing firms more flexibility as to what they can hold in portfolios would further 
some important public policy objectives. For one thing, it seems important to allow for sufficient 
short-term capacity to bridge any short-term demand or supply discontinuities in the market, thus 
                                                 
46 Such restrictions may still impose substantial transition costs on the multifamily market in the near-term, as new 
investors have to move into the market. 
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making the secondary mortgage market more liquid by smoothing demand for mortgage debt 
during downturns. (Of course, major disruptions in the marketplace, as happened more recently, 
were too large to deal with through additions to the portfolio; they required joint action by the 
Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Bank directly intervened to purchase agency MBSs.) 
 
For another, the portfolio might be used to focus on sectors of the market that draw fewer private 
investors and rely today heavily on the GSEs as a source of demand and liquidity.47 The 
arguments might be strongest in the case of multifamily projects that draw relatively few private 
investors and are less likely than subprime investments to generate systemic risk. Other possible 
markets in which a portfolio capacity might be critical would be the underserved, which could 
include borrowers receiving federally-approved housing counseling or those with nontraditional 
forms of credit. Finally, having the ability to hold loans in portfolio might facilitate the testing of 
new products and programs.  
 
If direct investments continue to be allowed, it is essential that there be full transparency with 
regard to the contents of the portfolio. 
H. Methods of Ownership 
Most of the discussion of the future of the GSEs has focused solely on the question of ownership. 
Ownership refers to the equity owners of an organization. The spectrum of ownership options 
runs from full nationalization to full private ownership. There are several alternatives between 
the extremes of public and private ownership. For example, public utilities are private companies 
that are granted exclusive rights to operate in a sector in return for accepting rate of return 
regulation. Another ownership alternative is co-operative (co-op) ownership, in which ownership 
of a property or organization is shared among those who operate and use it, which in the case of 
secondary housing finance markets would be banks and other mortgage originators.  
 
As we have learned with the current structure of the GSEs, the form of ownership can have a 
critical impact on the way an entity behaves. Thus, this section considers different possible 
structures to see which are most compatible with the goals outlined above (liquidity, 
countercyclical stability, safe and well-priced products, serving the underserved). An additional 
criterion for entities that are expected to be privately owned is their ability to raise capital from 
non-government sources. The answer to this question depends upon competition for products 
that they securitize and the cost of the government enhancement compared to impact on cost of 
funds and cost of regulatory compliance.48  
 
There are also hybrids of these options, including having public sector or public interest 
members of the boards of otherwise private entities.49 For purposes of discussion, all of the 
organizational forms discussed below will presume the existence of a government wrap for 
MBSs with the exception of full privatization. 
                                                 
47 Ambrose and Thibodeau (2004) show that targeted portfolio purchases of low- and moderate-income mortgages 
can help to increase the supply of low-income mortgage credit. 
48 None of the options with regard to ownership deal directly with the pro-cyclical dangers inherent in the current 
legal structure of the securities due to the difficulty of doing modifications and short sales—both of which can be 
critical for mitigating the number of foreclosures. 
49 Pre-conservatorship, five of the eighteen members of the Fannie Mae board were appointed by the President of the 
United States (Fannie Mae Charter, § 308(b)). 
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i. Full Nationalization  
Few economists favor government ownership, though public ownership is sometimes justified 
for the provision of public goods that a private market would not provide, like some aspects of 
national defense, or merit goods that we believe should be provided universally, like public 
education. A key advantage of nationalization is eliminating the conflict between the GSEs’ 
private interests and public purposes by eliminating the profit motive. The problem of regulatory 
capture would be eliminated, though it might be replaced by concerns about the corrupting 
influence of political pressure and the difficulties government has in regulating itself. 
Nationalization could also preserve the standardization and consumer protections built into 
current GSE securitization operations. Nationalization could also simplify, but not eliminate, the 
principal-agent problems inherent in the web of players now involved in originating and 
underwriting of mortgages and then distributing the MBSs to investors. Finally, because 
nationalization would involve relatively little change from the post-conservatorship status quo, it 
would not likely disrupt the mortgage market.  
 
Nevertheless, most economists believe that public ownership would likely reduce incentives for 
innovation and potentially create inflexible and unresponsive systems of mortgage securitization. 
These disadvantages could eventually build significant inefficiencies and distortions into the 
mortgage system, raising mortgage rates and increasing systemic risk. Nationalization would 
wipe out existing GSE shareholders, and the GSEs would become a stand-alone government 
agency.50 Nationalization would likely concentrate the prime MBS market in a single, 
guaranteed, publicly-owned federal agency, which might have a monopoly depending on the 
ability of other entities to compete in the marketplace for the same borrowers. The new agency’s 
MBSs might receive a “wrap” guarantee similar to Ginnie Mae MBSs, backed by the full faith 
and credit of the U.S. government. Government officials would manage portfolio operations 
according to goals for mortgage liquidity, systemic stability, multifamily targets, and housing 
subsidies. Funding for any portfolio operations would come from selling bonds of the federal 
government and would add to the national debt. 
 
Some have suggested that rather than creating a new agency, the government should fold current 
GSE operations into FHA and Ginnie Mae. FHA would extend its guarantee program to the 
prime market (or to a specific set of prime mortgages) in exchange for an actuarially-sound fee. 
Ginnie Mae could continue to wrap the securities created from pools of insured mortgages with a 
further guarantee.  
 
However, there are at least three additional risks to nationalization. First, creating a new 
government agency would be difficult, and there are serious questions about whether FHA has 
the capacity to handle GSE operations. Second, moving the existing net liabilities of the GSEs on 
to the federal government’s balance sheet will increase the nominal value of the national debt. 
Third, to state the obvious, once nationalized, the entities would not be expected to pay back the 
government for its bailout money. 
ii. Conservatorship  
                                                 
50 There would have to be some mechanism for valuing common stock now held by private shareholders, possibly 
through some bankruptcy-type court. 
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Another structure short of nationalization is conservatorship—the current state of affairs for the 
GSEs. While no one thinks that this is a permanent solution, it has the advantage in the short run 
of being the least disruptive for the secondary market and for the administration’s efforts to deal 
with loan modifications, foreclosures, REO, etc. Technically, the fact that the federal 
government owns less than 80 percent of the GSEs allows the administration to keep the 
operations of the GSEs off the books for purposes of the federal budget and debt. However, the 
CBO is already including the existing net liabilities and projected increase in potential losses 
from the issuance of guarantees in the future (Congressional Budget Office 2010).51 
 
Conservatorship has two key problems. The first is the continued existence and rights of the 
private shareholders whose interests have not been wiped out, as they would with either 
receivership/bankruptcy or nationalization. The second is the uncertainty for the staff of the 
GSEs who are concerned about their futures. On this second issue, it might be helpful if this 
interim state were given a minimum time for it to continue so, for example, the staff could feel 
comfortable that the GSEs would continue to exist for at least another, say, three to five years. 
iii. Public Utility  
Adoption of a public utility model would allow for a high level of regulation not just with regard 
to the types of mortgages that can be bought and the capital requirements, but also the level of 
fees that can be charged, the overall level of profitability that can be achieved (presumably based 
on a return on capital, given the capital requirements, and even the organization structure, 
including the use of affiliates. The public utility model could have either purely private or a mix 
of public and private ownership and/or representation on board of directors. 
 
A key challenge would be the setting of the prices and fees that would yield a spread that would 
provide the entity with the allowed rate of return. With the mortgage market as volatile as it is 
over the business cycle and with the market share of the utilities subject to some degree of 
competition, it will be hard to set pricing that will provide anything like a consistent rate of 
return on capital. 
 
If the number of entities that were regulated as public utilities were limited in number, then the 
public utility model would also preserve some of the standardization and liquidity benefits of the 
GSEs. Also, the GSEs’ functions in standardization, consumer protection, and housing 
affordability could be preserved. A strong regulator and fixed rate of return would be intended to 
reduce issues of moral hazard and regulatory capture, though it is not clear that these 
mechanisms would be completely successful. 
 
The principal objection to the public utility model is that it might reduce innovation and 
efficiency to the point where the GSEs would no longer be competitive in the market. In order to 
introduce a new product, or a new borrowing or lending practice, the firms would have to receive 
regulatory approval from a public board. A public utility regulator has typically worked best in 
the case of natural monopolies, like utilities, but the mortgage finance market has always been 
subject to competition. A key issue will be what types of barriers to entry the government might 
impose to limit the competition. If the new entities are subject to competition and their market 
share slipped, then their benefits of standardization, consumer protection, and perhaps even their 
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ability to provide counter-cyclical support to the market could be lost as well. Under the best-
known version of the model proposed by former Treasury Secretary Paulson (2007), the new 
utilities would still be subject to competition from private-label MBS issuers in all sectors of the 
market.  
iv. Cooperative Ownership 
Cooperatives (co-ops) are run on a non-profit basis, and each member is required to contribute 
equity in the new GSE proportional to, for example, the value of mortgage debt that it 
securitized. In other words, a co-op would be run so as to generate little or no surplus, and any 
surplus that it did generate would be paid back to member organizations in proportion to how 
much debt they securitized. Because co-op control would, most likely, also be distributed based 
on member securitization, the largest mortgage originators would exert the most control over the 
co-op, thus creating the danger that the largest members will capture control and adopt rules and 
regulations that may be at odds with the interest of the smaller members.52 
 
The cooperative option would have several advantages. First, it would be likely to maintain high 
levels of standardization and mortgage debt liquidity. Although member institutions would still 
have incentives to create innovative, liquid MBS products to distribute their mortgage debt, their 
at-cost charter and open access to all market participants would prevent the co-op from collecting 
monopoly rents. The co-op’s guarantee structure would encourage liquidity and likely facilitate 
the continuation of 30-year, fixed-rate, no-prepayment-penalty mortgages as standard. Moreover, 
the job of the government regulator may be made easier since the members of the co-op (who 
have capital at risk) may be more motivated to police themselves (Flannery and Frame 2006).53 
In fact, the danger may be that they will be too conservative, particularly in undertaking any 
mission-related activities. 
 
The co-op option could have several disadvantages. First, the co-op(s) would be controlled by 
large private banks whose interests may not coincide with those of smaller originators (including 
small banks) or of consumer protection. Second, cooperative ownership does not solve the 
conflict between public and private purposes that currently characterizes the GSEs. Regulatory 
capture and moral hazard would still be significant risks. If the co-op can securitize riskier, 
higher-interest loans without increasing the insurance premiums paid to the government, its 
members and executives might be tempted to take advantage of the opportunity. Third, a 
secondary mortgage market that was highly concentrated in one or two huge co-ops could be 
very vulnerable to systemic risk if a co-op became insolvent, as may happen to some of the 
Federal Home Loan banks. 
v. Improved Pre-Conservatorship Status Quo 
Another approach would be to keep the GSE model but refine it to mitigate some of the 
problems that likely precipitated their insolvency. Many believe that the GSEs got into trouble 
primarily through purchasing and securitizing excessively risky loans and by maintaining 
insufficient capital levels. Thus, going forward, the government might require higher capital 
levels, create a stronger regulator (and also more heavily regulate their PLS competitors), limit 
                                                 
52 The federal home loan banks mitigate this potential problem by placing limits on the maximum voting rights of 
any individual member, regardless of its size (see Flannery and Frame 2006). 
53 The authors note that the structure of the FHLBs did not necessarily lead to less risk taking than for the GSEs. 
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their securitization of non-prime mortgage debt, restrict—or eliminate altogether—their retained 
mortgage portfolios, and make the government guarantee of GSE obligations explicit for an 
actuarially-sound fee. Under these reforms, the market for prime MBSs would remain highly 
concentrated, private investor ownership of GSE equity would hopefully be rejuvenated, and the 
ultimate credit risk for prime mortgage debt would be left with the government through a 
reformed guarantee. 
 
This approach offers several advantages. First, the GSEs would retain most of the liquidity 
benefits of current GSE securitization operations, for both the single- and multifamily markets. 
Second, this option would preserve the existing standardization of consumer and investor 
products, including a 30-year, fixed-rate, no-prepayment-penalty mortgage and the existing TBA 
market. Third, it would not require a new entity to reinvent all the controls that the GSEs have 
put in place to control principal-agent problems, although the GSEs probably have more to do in 
this regard. Another advantage of trying to fix up the existing model is that it might make it 
possible for the government to recoup its bailout funds.  
 
Preserving a variant of the status quo has several potential disadvantages too. First, by preserving 
a hybrid structure, the proposal would not resolve the conflict between the GSEs’ private 
interests and public purposes. GSE insiders would arguably continue to have an interest in 
obtaining regulatory or legislative approval for imprudent risk-taking. Second, a prime MBS 
market with only two participants could suffer inefficiencies from lack of competition (though it 
is unclear where to strike the balance between competition and standardization). Third, by failing 
to address the issue of the GSEs’ huge size and market dominance, it would leave the firms “too 
big to fail” and continue to generate systemic risk. One variant would be to increase the number 
of GSEs/charters to add to the number of entities allowed to issue the guaranteed MBSs. This 
could help to increase competition, and lessen the “too big to fail” problem. 
vi. Full Privatization (with no government backing) 
In a fully-privatized model, the government would cease to be involved in guaranteeing the 
market for prime MBSs, implicitly or explicitly, eliminating the interest rate subsidy that this 
guarantee provides. The potential advantages of privatization include the greater efficiency that 
might come from the increased competition in the mortgage market (assuming that there are 
more than two entities as exist now with the GSEs). With privatization, there would cease to be 
any conflict between the GSEs’ private and public purposes. Without any government 
guarantees, firms would have to internalize the risks of their investments. Privatization might 
also lead to reduced market concentration and thus decrease systemic risk, by purging the market 
of “too big to fail” institutions. Of course, it is also possible that a few large private financial 
institutions would dominate the secondary market, even in the absence of government backing. If 
so, the dangers inherent in these firms too big to fail will now spill over into the secondary 
mortgage market as well. 
 
However, privatization could have serious disadvantages too. As noted above, researchers have 
shown that GSE MBSs have helped to provide some countercyclicality to the market by 
providing credit even during times of market contraction (Quigley 2006; Peak and Wilcox 2006). 
The volume of private-label investment is more likely to contract during market downturns. 
Elimination of government guarantees could make long-term, fixed-rate, no-prepayment-penalty 
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mortgages and the TBA market unviable, and fully private firms might promote riskier mortgage 
products.54 The new, fully-private firms may not choose to play such a large role in the 
multifamily sector, as private investors have generally been more reluctant to buy multifamily 
mortgages and related securities than single-family MBSs (see, for example, DiPasquale and 
Cummings 1992). Finally, opponents of privatization argue that the recent experience of private-
label MBSs issuers demonstrates that a private market with minimal regulation is likely to 
generate significant systemic risk.  
I. Transition Issues 
A final consideration in evaluating any proposal is ease of transition. Any rapid and drastic 
alteration to the structure of the secondary mortgage market, and especially to GSE MBS 
operations, is likely to cause a costly and unpredictable disruption in the TBA market and the 
mortgage market more generally, potentially harming homebuyers, investors, and even 
taxpayers. Another transition issue is how to handle the GSEs’ current preferred stock held by 
Treasury, and how to handle the hard-to-value “toxic” assets on the GSEs’ current books. 
Depending on how these issues are resolved, private investors might be hesitant to invest in GSE 
successor institutions. Given that many of these proposals recommend a reduction in retained 
portfolios, a third issue is that the rapid sale of portfolio assets would be likely to seriously 
disrupt the secondary mortgage market. The simplest and least disruptive way to eliminate the 
retained portfolios would be simply to prohibit the GSEs from making more purchases, and 
allow their portfolios to mature and shrink over time. Finally, a long or uncertain transition 
period will accelerate the departure of top talent from the GSEs, which will undermine the 
capacity of any successor institution. 
 
Each of the different models of ownership present their own transition challenges. Clearly 
continuing to keep the GSEs in conservatorship would represent the easiest transition. But it is 
possible that the continued uncertainty about the future might lead additional staff to leave. Most 
nationalization scenarios present a relatively straightforward transition too, given that the two 
entities are already under government control. The MBS operations would not have to be halted. 
Policy makers would be confronted with important questions about whether and how to continue 
GSE portfolio operations, which would be especially important for the multifamily market. The 
biggest transition risk posed by nationalization is probably the wholesale departure of many top 
GSE employees, although many have undoubtedly left already.  
 
Moving to a variant of the pre-conservatorship model would be relatively easy too. Because 
these options would preserve many features of the current status quo, they would involve fairly 
minimal disruption to the secondary mortgage market. One potential challenge could be a lack of 
interest from private investors, who might be frightened by the GSEs’ recent conservatorship, 
and/or worried about potential new restrictions on portfolio investments. To restore the firms to 
profitability before releasing them from conservatorship, the FHFA may have to relieve them of 
some of the toxic mortgage assets that they still hold as well as the 10 percent dividend they owe 
                                                 
54 It is conceivable that, even without the government wrap, investors might be willing to buy securities backed by 
30-year, fixed-rate mortgages with no prepayment penalty. However, such securities would require significant 
structuring into separate tranches with different credit and interest rate risks. The likely result is that the borrower 
would have to pay relatively high interest costs for such a mortgage, even compared to the case where a government 
wrap is provided and is fully priced for the risk. 
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the government on the preferred stock it owns. In practice, the viability of this option depends on 
whether the GSEs can quickly regain profitability and repurchase the preferred stock created by 
the government during conservatorship. 
 
The transition to a co-op model would be far more challenging. A co-op model would require the 
government to wipe out current GSE shareholders, possibly re-allocate GSE operations into a 
single corporate structure, and then recapitalize that structure through mortgage originators. It 
may encounter resistance from mortgage originators that do not want to capitalize the new entity, 
and it might have trouble keeping GSEs’ top talent from departing if, for example, it had a lower 
pay scale. A switch to a public utility model would also be likely to accelerate the departure of 
top talent from the GSEs.  
 
Finally, fully privatizing Fannie and Freddie could seriously disrupt secondary market 
operations, and would require careful planning on a host of issues. GSE staff might be provided 
incentives to stay on during the chaos of the transition. Portfolio purchases would cease, and the 
government would have to devise a mechanism to take on the GSEs’ toxic assets. Securitization 
could gradually transfer to private holding companies, for which regulatory and capitalization 
standards would have to be set. Capital for those firms would have to be raised through equity 
markets, but it may be difficult to attract shareholders if the successor firms were still liable for 
GSEs preferred stock obligations created during the bailout and now held by the conservator. 
Their mortgage databases could be turned over to a separate corporation cooperatively-owned 
and accessed by all secondary market participants.  
i. Additional Transition Concerns for Multifamily  
Another transition issue which has particular relevance for the multifamily sector is what to do 
with the LIHTC portfolio. The tax credits currently have no value to Fannie or Freddie given that 
they have no current tax liability. But if the two entities were to sell these credits off, they could 
significantly reduce the demand for new credits and so reduce their price making them a less 
useful tool for building affordable rental housing. In any case, the Treasury is unlikely to 
approve their sale, as buyers pay less than dollar-for-dollar for the credits, which reduce tax 
revenues dollar-for-dollar.  
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III. EVALUATING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS 
 
As the debate about the future of the GSEs has intensified, a number of organizations have 
proposed new models for a housing finance system. The following considers four of these 
proposals, describes their key features (including the nature of the proposed credit enhancement, 
the nature of regulation, the number of competitors, the legal structures for ownership, and 
transition challenges), and examines the degree to which they are likely to meet the four goals 
we set out earlier in the paper with regard to both single- and multifamily mortgages: 
 
− Access to liquid credit markets nationwide, 
− Counter-cyclical stability, 
− Availability of safe products that are well-priced and clearly understood by 
borrowers, and 
− Provision of credit for the underserved. 
 
The four main proposals we examine share a few key features. All four envision a set of 
privately-owned participants in the secondary market, and perhaps most notably, they all 
recommend an explicit federal government wrap, supported by a fee paid by insured parties, 
which would be available only to those MBSs that contain mortgages that meet specific criteria. 
This shared feature helps all the proposals address, at least to some degree, the first three of our 
four goals. 
 
After reviewing the four proposals, we also describe an idea for the multifamily housing finance 
market and consider the possibility of developing a market for covered bonds 
A. Center for American Progress 
In December 2009, the Center for American Progress (CAP) issued a draft white paper on the 
future of the U.S. secondary market for residential mortgages titled “A Responsible Market for 
Housing Finance.” The paper offers an initial model but acknowledges that many issues remain 
unresolved and questions unanswered.55 
Key Features 
The proposal recommends an explicit federal government guarantee for MBSs that contain 
single-family mortgages that are safe, sustainable, and transparent for borrowers, and are thus 
expected to be low risk. The proposal recommends that the guarantee also be used to back 
mortgages for multifamily, rental housing. Securitizers of these MBSs would be 
comprehensively regulated as would issuers of private-label securities. All issuers of MBSs 
would be subject to carry out a duty to serve underserved communities.  
 
The basic structure involves creating a limited number of charter mortgage issuers (CMIs) to 
issue government-guaranteed, mortgage-backed securities (MBSs)—both single- and 
                                                 
55 The proposal lays out three core principles that are highly consistent with the four goals laid out in this paper: 
broad and constant liquidity, systemic stability achieved through responsible risk oversight, and wide and fair 
availability of affordable mortgage credit. 
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multifamily. The CMIs would only be able to securitize single-family mortgages that are viewed 
as safe, sustainable, and transparent (e.g., 30-year, fixed-rate single-family mortgage with no 
prepayment penalty) with the intention that credit-worthy borrowers would be able to have 
access to these products at an affordable price throughout a business or credit cycle. The size of 
mortgages eligible for the guarantee would be capped. As for multifamily mortgages, the goal 
would be to ensure the availability of affordable rental housing. 
 
All mortgage securitizers would be heavily regulated (as would banks) with regard to products, 
capital, and operational and credit risk. By providing a more level regulatory field, it is hoped 
that a race to the bottom would be prevented and the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage 
reduced. The CMIs would have an explicit duty to provide countercyclical stability to the 
mortgage market. It is contemplated that the current GSEs could be transitioned into CMIs with 
their bad assets transferred to a “bad” bank, which would have the task of handling the troubled 
mortgages.  
 
The government guarantee would only apply if a CMI’s capital was inadequate to meet its 
obligations to make timely payments of principal and interest on its MBSs. To guard against 
having to call on the government guarantee, capital and reserve requirements would be imposed 
in addition to the regulatory oversight of credit and operational risk. The government would be 
paid a “small” fee for every MBS issued by a CMI, although it is unclear if the fee would be 
considered, as a budgetary matter, sufficient to compensate the government for the risk it is 
undertaking. There would be no guarantee of the debts of the CMI and no government guarantee 
at all for MBSs issued by other mortgage issuers. 
 
There is no discussion as to whether the number of CMIs should be limited, or whether to allow 
a larger number but force them to deliver their securities through a limited number of TBA 
markets (currently, two TBA markets exist as both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have created 
their own). The CMIs would be privately-owned (with the co-op model considered as a 
possibility) but subject to regulation of profit.  
 
By eliminating the corporate guarantee (albeit implicit) and favorable capital requirements, the 
proposal removes the key factors that made direct investments especially profitable. Moreover, 
the proposal seeks to reduce the size of the portfolio by only allowing investments in pursuit of 
certain public purposes which would be defined by the CMIs’ primary regulator and would 
include: supporting affordable multifamily housing—including mixed-income and mixed-use 
development and small multifamily, providing capacity for crises, and testing of new products.  
 
To serve the underserved, the proposal contemplates a fee on each MBS issue to support an 
Affordable Housing Trust Fund (and Capital Magnet Fund) as well as a duty for both the CMIs 
and OMIs to serve all markets at all times in a fair and equitable manner. Beyond this obligation, 
CMIs would be required to undertake certain enhanced duties in return for receiving a 
government guarantee on their MBS, providing them with a cost advantage in the capital 
markets, and access to a market limited to other firms similarly situated with high barriers to 
entry. Affordable housing goals as they currently exist would be eliminated. The roles of 
FHA/VA/GNMA would continue. 
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As noted, the CAP proposal leaves open a number of issues, some intentionally. In particular, it 
looks to draw comments and suggestions on (1) how to make sure that CMIs can raise capital as 
well as to be able to cross-subsidize any activities to serve the underserved that incur higher costs 
or risk that cannot be recovered through fees, and (2) the number and specific legal structure of 
the CMIs. It does not spell out how it would coordinate the regulators to ensure a level playing 
field across all players in the mortgage market, although it does float the possibility of creating a 
Housing Markets Coordinating Council to create a platform for coordinating the efforts of all the 
regulators plus HUD and Treasury. It is silent on the issue of how to promote innovation, 
although it places no restrictions on banks that keep the loans in their portfolios (although bank 
regulators will have something to say about what can be in that portfolio). Lastly, it lacks any 
specifics of transitioning the GSEs to the new model, although it does recognize the importance 
of preserving as much as possible the extensive infrastructure, resources, and expertise of the two 
firms as well as minimizing disruption to the housing markets.  
B. Credit Suisse 
In October of 2009, Credit Suisse issued a Mortgage Market Comment titled “GSEs—Still the 
Best Answer for Housing Finance.” As the title suggests, the focus of the proposal is to preserve 
the GSEs in order not to disrupt the existing housing finance market (and the TBA market in 
particular) and to take full advantage of the GSEs’ existing technology, infrastructure, and 
intellectual capital.56  
Key Features 
The proposal provides for an explicit federal government guarantee for MBSs that contain basic 
mortgage products with well-understood risk characteristics. The reformed GSEs would be 
subject to strong regulatory oversight and higher capital requirements. There would be no 
affordable housing mandate for single-family, but the reformed GSEs would still be required to 
meet affordable housing goals for multifamily housing. The paper lays out in some detail an 
analysis of the likely range of impact of the incremental cost of fully-priced government 
guarantee, the increased capital costs (including those to ensure counter-cyclical stability), and 
the saving in borrowing cost from having an explicit government guarantee. Their conclusion is 
that borrowing costs would go up a net of 25–35bp above the pre-crisis guarantee cost of 15bp. 
 
Each of the GSEs would be divided into a “good bank” that would retain healthy guarantee and 
portfolio assets and a “bad” bank, with the former conducting a well-capitalized, privately held 
mortgage guarantee business with a “full-faith-and-credit” government reinsurance wrap on the 
MBS in case of catastrophic loss. They would run a scaled-back portfolio business (expected to 
eventually fall to half its current size) that would be used to smooth out market distortions and 
maintain traditional role of the GSEs as the counter-cyclical buyer of mortgages. Little is said 
about the “bad bank,” other than that it would work through the existing credit and portfolio 
book of problem loans/securities. 
 
                                                 
56 The article lays out five key objectives: preserving TBA market liquidity, minimizing disruption to the market and 
maximizing continuity, improving control and risk management, minimizing operational involvement by 
government, and continuing operations even in the event of a catastrophic credit. 
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As a way to prevent “mission creep,” the Credit Suisse proposal would require both the FHFA 
and Congress to agree before any expansion of product mix would be allowed. By adding the 
Congressional review, it could inhibit innovation and would certainly add a political overlay to 
the process. The GSEs would also have a credit line with the Fed, which would be collateralized 
with the MBSs purchased with that credit. Given all these safeguards, it is expected that the GSE 
debt would trade close to treasuries. 
 
To limit the risk, GSEs’ participation would be restricted to basic mortgage products with well-
understood risk characteristics including, it appears, the traditional set of conforming mortgages 
that follow specified underwriting standards. The GSEs would be prohibited from buying and 
securitizing Alt-A and subprime loans. The entities would also be subject to strong regulatory 
oversight to ensure compliance and effective risk management and would have their equity 
capital requirement doubled immediately and doubled again over the next decade or two. To 
reduce the cost to the borrower, the government could provide some of the equity and not require 
a return. (The proposal suggests converting the existing preferred equity to common stock with 
the GSEs’ retaining the option to buy it back.) 
 
With these capital and regulatory requirements on the GSEs, the government wrap is expected to 
be needed only in the event of credit meltdowns, which are estimated to occur every fifty to one 
hundred years. The wrap will be fully priced based on a loss every twenty to fifty years (priced at 
ten and two basis points, respectively), and these fees should make it deficit neutral with regards 
to the federal budget. 
 
The proposal allows for more “primary mortgage guarantors” (PMGs) than just the two GSEs, as 
long as it would not jeopardize liquidity of TBA market. Given the priority on liquidity, there is 
no discussion of whether more players might have value as a way to increase competition, 
although the authors suggest that the number of PMGs could be increased further if they are all 
required to deliver their conventional Agency MBS into the Fannie or Freddie TBA markets. As 
for product innovation by the PMGs, the proposal actively discourages it, by requiring joint 
approval by the FHFA and Congress. The proposal also precludes any affordable housing 
mandate for single-family but does retain one for multifamily. Any so-called risky loans should 
be under the purview of FHA with the government providing explicit funding for policy 
mandates. 
 
The Credit Suisse proposal fails to make any mention of the regulation of the PLS market. While 
the strong regulation of the GSEs would help reduce the threat of a race to the bottom, 
eliminating this threat would require regulation of the PLS market as well, which would prevent 
unregulated or lightly regulated entities from unfairly capturing market share (partly as a result 
of their mispricing of risk), and potentially leaving only a marginal share of the market to the 
securitizers of the guaranteed MBSs. There is also no discussion of what forces—market, 
regulatory or other—would serve to constrain the pricing by the successors to the GSEs by 
preventing them from garnering excess profits and ensure they pass on to the borrowers the 




C. Mortgage Bankers Association 
In August 2009, the Council on Ensuring Mortgage Liquidity of the Mortgage Bankers 
Association released “Recommendations for the Future Government Role in the Core Secondary 
Mortgage Market,” based on their earlier release in March 2009 of “Principles for Ensuring 
Mortgage Liquidity.” Underlying the proposal is the proposition that the role of the federal 
government should be to promote liquidity for investor purchases of mortgage-backed securities, 
while protecting taxpayers by bringing in private capital to absorb all of the risk, save for periods 
of extreme economic distress.  
Key features 
The proposal is built around the establishment of privately-owned, chartered mortgage credit-
guarantor entities (MCGEs) that provide loan-level guarantees and issue MBSs that are wrapped 
with an explicit government guarantee. The MCGEs would be mono-line institutions focused 
solely on the mortgage credit guarantee and securitization business and would be subject to 
strong regulation. These entities would be subject to high capital requirements and limited as to 
the products they could guarantee, thus helping to ensure that under all but the most dire 
economic circumstances, they would be able to cover all mortgage-related credit losses. The 
federal insurance fund would then be called upon only in situations of extreme distress, and it 
would place a risk-based charge on every MBS issued to cover the cost of taking that credit risk. 
The entity providing the government guarantee could be conceptually similar to GNMA and 
would be responsible for standardization of mortgage products, indentures, and mortgage 
documentation for the core mortgage market. To help ensure that the MCGEs would securitize 
both single- and multifamily, the governance structure of the MCGEs would have representation 
from both the single- and multifamily markets. 
 
None of the corporate debt or equity the MCGEs issue would be guaranteed, either explicitly or 
implicitly, by the federal government. The MCGEs would rely on their own capital base as well 
as risk-retention from originators, issuers, and other secondary market entities such as mortgage 
insurers. The MCGEs would be required to manage their credit risk by using risk-based pricing, 
purchasing private mortgage insurance (PMI) and adopting risk transfer mechanisms, including 
other risk-sharing arrangements, providing representations and warranties to the investors, and 
maintaining sufficient capital reserves to ensure that there is a strong capital buffer before the 
government guarantee and insurance fund would come into play. 
 
Only securities issued by a MCGE would be eligible for the government guarantee, and these 
securities could contain only “core” mortgage products with well-understood, well-documented 
risk characteristics. Included in this category would be “conventional” single-family mortgage 
products traditionally supported by the GSEs, including those currently eligible for TBA 
funding, and multifamily mortgage products that fit the GSEs’ published underwriting 
guidelines, including affordable multifamily rental housing mortgage products. To ensure 
countercyclical stability in times of extreme market distress, the Treasury and/or Federal Reserve 
could purchase government-guaranteed mortgage securities to provide liquidity. 
 
The MCGEs’ regulator should be strong, empowered, and adequately funded through the 
government guarantee insurance premiums. The regulation regime contemplated would be 
similar to that of a public utility, with the MCGEs earning a conservative return on equity. The 
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regulator should have the power to adequately oversee the MCGEs, specifically with regard to 
products, pricing, and capital adequacy. The corporate capital levels of the MCGEs must be 
actuarially sound, and the entities would have to report regularly to the satisfaction of the 
Treasury and the MCGEs’ regulator. 
 
As for the number of MCGEs that would be allowed, the proposal lays out a set of criteria 
without saying how each would be evaluated and weighed. The criteria cover the topics of a) 
competition, b) strong and effective regulatory oversight, c) efficiency and scale, d) 
standardization, e) security volume and liquidity, f) ensuring no one MCGE becomes “too big to 
fail,” and g) the transition from the current government sponsored entity (GSE) framework. 
Initially, the number of MCGEs should be either two or three. The ownership of at least one of 
the MCGEs could be in a co-op form with mortgage lenders as shareholders. Other private 
institutions could also issue government guarantee securities if backed by a MCGE loan-level 
guarantee, meaning that a MCGE will have approved and insured the underlying collateral. 
 
The proposal contemplates the revival of a PLS market that may include loans that are not be 
well-documented or well-understood. The issuance of these PLSs would rely entirely on private 
capital and management of risks. There is no discussion of government regulation and therefore 
no discussion of the possibility of their competing away the market share of the MCGs. 
 
The MCGEs would be allowed to have only a de minimus portfolio of mortgage assets. The 
portfolios’ purposes would be to support securitization by allowing the MCGEs to (a) aggregate 
allowable mortgages for securitization, (b) manage loss mitigation through foreclosure, 
modifications, and other activities, (c) incubate mortgages that may need seasoning prior to 
securitization, (d) develop new mortgage products through a strictly limited level of research and 
development prior to the development of a full-fledged securitization market, and (e) fund highly 
structured multifamily mortgages that are not conducive to securitization. 
 
The proposal specifically rules out the addition of public or social policy goals and looks to the 
FHA, VA, RHS, GNMA, and other direct federal tax and spending programs to continue to play 
their key roles. However, it notes that, if CRA-related loans are included in the definition of core 
products, the MCGEs and government guarantee would provide a transparent and liquid market 
into which lenders can deliver them on a pricing and risk-adjusted basis. 
 
While no specific transition plan is laid out, the proposal looks to use the infrastructure of the 
existing GSEs as a foundation for new MCGEs, with the technology, human capital, standard 
documents, and existing relationships that the GSEs have developed available to one or more 
MCGEs. Every effort would be made to transfer existing origination, servicing, and other 
industry relationships from the GSEs to the new MCGEs so as not to strand originators and 
servicers with ties to the existing GSEs. The proposal calls for decisions regarding the futures of 
the GSEs to be made expeditiously so as to reduce continued losses of talent at Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. The good bank/bad bank resolution of the GSEs is designed to facilitate a more 
rapid transition, to maximize the usefulness of the existing infrastructure of the GSEs, and to 




In general, the MBA proposal lacks specifics beyond laying out a model for a dual level of 
guarantees. As noted above, the proposal does not discuss the type and degree of regulation of 
the PLS market, thus leaving open the issue of how to prevent loss of market share through 
improperly priced competition. Product innovation seems to be discouraged, at least by the 
MCGEs, since the proposal specifically requires that new products by the MCGEs would require 
approval from the regulator. 
D. The Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable 
Recently, the Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable circulated a proposal 
for the secondary market. Like the other proposals, it calls for an explicit government guarantee 
for those MBSs that are backed by a select set of mortgage products, but unlike the other models, 
it calls for the creation of a new type of entity—an MBS Issuing Utility—and a single type of 
MBS to help ensure a broad market for the securities.  
Key Features 
The proposal creates a set of chartered entities, called MBS insurance companies (MSICs), to 
replace the GSEs. These entities would provide credit enhancement for both MBSs and for 
portfolios of residential and multifamily mortgages. They would be privately capitalized and 
subject to comprehensive safety and soundness regulation, including capital and liquidity 
standards. They would contract with the MBS Issuing Entity, which would provide basic 
securitization services such as packaging the mortgage loans and process of payment on the 
MBS, and which would charge them a fee. The MSICs will be limited in the type of mortgages 
that can be included in the MBSs they insure. The mortgages would have to meet underwriting 
and loan size standards set by FHFA. 
 
The MSICs would have no federal backstop, although there was some concern that they may 
initially have some problems raising private capital, so they may need some temporary funding 
by the government. MSICs would not be subject to any profit or pricing regulation and so the 
marketplace will determine how many emerge, what legal form they take, and whether they 
specialize by the types of loans (single-family, multifamily, or sub-categories of each) that are in 
the MBSs they insure. The MSICs would be permitted to maintain portfolios that would be 
limited in size and usable only for liquidity or hedging purposes or to facilitate the development 
of new products, including loans for multifamily housing. 
 
The MBSs insured by the MSICs would have a government guarantee with the ostensible 
purpose of reducing the cost of mortgage loans. Clearly, however, it will also help provide the 
mortgage market with some countercyclical stability. The guarantee would be fully priced for 
risk so that its existence will be revenue neutral with regard to the federal budget. The guarantee 
would be for payments of interest and principal and would be triggered only after the private 
capital of the MSICs is exhausted. 
 
The proposal looks to address the underserved in two ways. First, built into the underwriting 
standards would be a requirement to support safe and sustainable mortgage products for all 
categories of borrowers, with the implication that that would include products for low- and 
moderate-income borrowers. Second, the MSICs would have to contribute a set percentage of 
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their annual revenues to an affordable housing fund, which would be allocated to state and local 
government housing finance agencies pursuant to a formula set by statute. 
 
While the proposal focuses on defining and limiting the roles of these types of new entities, it 
does not provide much detail on anything else, at least as of yet. It is silent, for example, on the 
possible re-emergence of a PLS market (although nothing suggests that it will not re-emerge) or 
whether and how that market would be regulated. It also does not address transition issues, 
although it is ostensibly designed to minimize disruptions to housing finance. 
E. Creating State Mortgage Insurance Funds for Multifamily Loans 
Very few of the existing proposals explicitly address multifamily housing finance. We think one 
existing program is a potentially interesting model. In particular, it might be possible to induce 
the creation of mortgage insurance funds at the state or local level, such as the fund run by the 
State of New York Mortgage Agency (SONYMA).57 SONYMA works with pre-approved 
lenders to develop loan programs tailored to local needs and government subsidies. Its insurance 
facilitates the sale of the loans to pension funds, which receive 100 percent credit insurance, 
thereby creating a ready and fairly-priced market for these loans. (Loans sold to private investors 
are eligible for up to 75 percent first-loss insurance.) Initially, the insurance provided by 
SONYMA covered only the permanent financing used as take-outs for construction loans that 
financed the renovation needs of deteriorating, but often still occupied multifamily housing. 
Today it covers a broader range of loans to help revitalize communities. With its own revenue 
stream from the mortgage transfer tax and limited losses, SONYMA has, over time, been able to 
achieve an AA rating. 
 
Such success could potentially be expanded and replicated over a much wider geography with 
the availability of a government MBS wrap and the thoughtful establishment of criteria for the 
structuring of these insurance funds (e.g., how much top loss insurance on individual 
transactions, what ratio of reserves to insured risk, what mechanism for claims payment, and the 
criteria for selecting originators). The explicit government guarantee would provide, from the 
beginning, an investment grade rating that could help create a secondary market for packages of 
these locally-underwritten and -tailored loans. With such a program, localities would be able to 
obtain sufficient capital for their unique housing needs and national investors could safely 
promote community development. The ongoing goal for the system would be to standardize both 
the origination of loans and their subsequent purchase by institutional investors. 
F. Covered Bonds: An Additional Source of Funds for Banks 
The ability of banks to serve the residential mortgage marketplace is limited by both the total 
amount of funds they have to loan and their appetite for mortgages as a percent of their assets. 
For banks, deposits represent the major source of funds to lend. However, banks may have 
sufficient capital to lend more but lack the funds. In this case, banks can raise additional money 
in the capital markets or, as in the case of members of Federal Home Loan banks, through 
“advances,” which can be collateralized with home mortgages.58  
 
                                                 
57 For further elaboration on this idea, see Lappin (2001). 
58 A number of Federal Home Loan banks also participate in the Mortgage Partnership Finance Program, which 
provides their members with another vehicle to tap to the secondary market. 
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Covered bonds are another potential way to expand the funds available for a bank to lend out. 
Covered bonds are issued by depositary institutions and backed by an over-collateralized, 
actively managed “cover pool” of mortgage loans. Issuing banks make the coupon payments 
from their general cash flows, and in case of default the bondholders have exclusive recourse to 
the cover pool, and then to the bank’s general assets (i.e., the bank retains 100 percent of the 
risk). The total amount the bank can then lend out for home mortgages depends on the size of its 
capital base and the desired diversity of assets. Covered bonds allow a bank to take full 
advantage of its capital base in those cases in which it otherwise finds itself with insufficient 
deposits and other sources of funds. 
 
New regulations and legislation have been proposed to facilitate the issuance of these types of 
instruments. To the extent, however, that the legislation gives preferred status to the collateral 
pledged for these bonds, the collateral available for the FDIC to access if the bank should go into 
receivership will be reduced, increasing the need to raise the fees on all banks for depository 
insurance and increasing the possibility that the taxpayer may eventually have to bailout the 
FDIC. In 2008, the U.S. Treasury issued best-practice recommendations for expanding the use of 
covered bonds. The FDIC (2008) also issued guidelines on how covered bonds would be treated 
in the event of a bank’s insolvency, and a bill was introduced in Congress in 2008 to expand the 
use of covered bonds in the United States (Garrett 2008). Although not widely used in the United 
States, covered bonds are the main vehicle of housing finance in many European countries.59  
 
There are two key differences between covered bonds and MBSs. First, in the case of covered 
bonds, the covered pool of mortgages remains on the bank’s balance sheet. Second, regulations 
typically require that the pool of mortgages be worth more than the value of outstanding bonds, 
and if the value of the pool falls too low, then the bank must add more collateral to the pool. In 
that sense, the bonds are over-collateralized by the cover pool. I f the bank defaults on the bonds, 
investors first have an exclusive claim to the mortgage pool, and then have recourse to the 
general assets of the bank.  
 
Covered bonds have three potential advantages over MBSs as a method of mortgage finance. 
First, they have the potential to reduce principal-agent problems, because the banks themselves 
would hold the loans underlying covered bonds, giving them an interest in originating better 
loans. Second, because the mortgage loans would simply remain on bank balance sheets and not 
be put into special trusts subject to the incentives of servicers, banks could modify failing loans 
far more easily than MBS trusts can. This could reduce foreclosures and maximize loan value.  
Third, depending on how they are implemented, covered bonds also hold the possibility of 
improving the options available to homebuyers who find themselves underwater. In Denmark, 
covered bonds operate according to the “balance principle.” The balance principle requires a 
match between each mortgage written and every bond issued. It permits homebuyers two options 
for paying off their debt: they may either pay off their mortgage at par, or they may repurchase 
their lender’s bonds on the open market, in an amount corresponding to the size of their 
mortgage, and return those bonds to the lender. Falling house prices will often depress the 
corresponding bond prices (though this may not always happen). When house and bond prices 
fall together, homeowners can sometimes refinance their homes at the new, lower house price, 
by buying back their bonds at the lower bond prices, and surrendering the bonds to the original 
                                                 
59 The first covered bond in the U.S. was issued by Washington Mutual in 2006 (Lucas et al. 2008). 
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lender. This new option for refinancing could reduce foreclosures in the event of a widespread 
decline in housing prices.  
 
There is uncertainty, however, in the extent to which covered bonds would deliver the same level 
of liquidity as GSE MBSs, because in a covered bond system, mortgage loans remain on bank 
balance sheets. Moreover, it may be difficult for covered bonds to achieve the minimum efficient 
scale to compete with government-backed GSE MBSs. As in Denmark, an effective covered 
bond market would require standardized bond forms, and a high-volume market that could 
demonstrate liquidity to potential buyers. If covered bonds were issued by hundreds of banks 
across the country, each with different underwriting standards and bond structures, the extensive 
market fragmentation would seriously reduce trading volume and liquidity for any particular 
covered bond issue. The Danish covered bond system is effective because the market is highly 
structured and homogenized, with only a few participating banks.60 
 
There are also important questions about whether covered bonds could be cost-competitive with 
existing channels of finance, which benefit from economies of scale, government subsidies, and 
well-developed regulatory frameworks. Covered bonds might require a phase of incubation and 
experimentation before they reached a minimum efficient scale and were widely accepted by 
investors.  
 
It seems unlikely that covered bonds would replace GSE MBSs or any other existing channel of 
housing finance. Rather, they could provide a new way to increase liquidity for market sectors—
like jumbo loans, which the GSEs do not handle. It is also possible that they could directly 
compete with the GSEs in the prime mortgage market. In a more radical restructuring, the GSEs 
could be abolished and the entire system could switch to covered bonds, or the GSEs could be 
reformed into covered bond issuers. However, these more radical options likely would seriously 
disrupt the housing finance system.  
 
There is little opposition to developing covered bonds as a source of funds for housing finance, 
and they may ultimately help to make the system more efficient and secure (Soros 2008). For 
these reasons, it may make sense to work at developing covered bonds, regardless of what other 
reforms are implemented in the housing finance system. 
                                                 
60 “There are eight mortgage credit institutions active in the Danish mortgage market, some 
affiliated with commercial banks (DLR, LR, Nordea Kredit, RealKredit Danmark, FIH), others 
operating on a standalone basis, as foundations (BRFKredit, NykreditRealkredit)” (International 




The secondary market has brought tremendous liquidity to the housing finance system in the 
United States, by drawing in capital from all over the world. The two GSEs, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, have been key players in this market. As federal government officials contemplate 
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